The role of averages in CV-QKD over fast fading channels
Miguel Castillo-Celeita, Matteo Schiavon
TL;DR
This paper analyzes CV-QKD over fast-fading channels by contrasting two security models: Holevo bound average (HBA) and covariance matrix average (CMA). It derives analytic expressions for SKR under both models: HBA computes $R=I_{AB}^{T_{min}}-\langle I_{BE}\rangle$, while CMA uses averaged covariance matrices leading to $R=\langle I_{AB}\rangle-\chi_{BE}(\widetilde{\lambda}_1,\widetilde{\lambda}_2,\widetilde{\lambda}_3)$ with effective parameters $T_{eff}$ and $\chi_{eff}$. The results show that treating channel fluctuations differently yields markedly different SKR behaviors, with HBA more robust in high-variance regimes and CMA requiring optimization of the modulation variance, highlighting practical implications for free-space and satellite CV-QKD. The study emphasizes the importance of selecting a model that accurately captures channel fluctuations and suggests CMA aligns more closely with experimental data, though both approaches have tradeoffs.
Abstract
This work presents a study of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocols over fast-fading channels, typically found in free-space communication links. Two eavesdropping models are considered to evaluate their security under collective attacks: \textit{Holevo bound average} (HBA) and \textit{covariance matrix average} (CMA). In the HBA approach, the Holevo bound is averaged over the channel transmittance. In contrast, the CMA method calculates the Holevo bound from the average covariance matrix. Analytical expressions are developed for both strategies. The two methods also differ in how they calculate the mutual information between the legitimate parties. The results demonstrate that the SKR is significantly influenced by how you treat channel fluctuations, highlighting the importance of choosing the model that better describes the actual implementation of the protocol.
