The Time to Consensus in a Blockchain: Insights into Bitcoin's "6 Blocks Rule''
Partha S. Dey, Aditya S. Gopalan, Vijay G. Subramanian
TL;DR
The paper addresses quantifying the time to consensus in Nakamoto-style blockchains under nontrivial network delays and a worst-case adversary. It develops a stochastic growth/queueing framework and derives a finite-consensus threshold, along with an exact Laplace transform and tail decay for the stylized Bitcoin model, complemented by simulations. For the general model, it introduces a cycle-based decomposition using quantities $(X_{(n)},Y_{(n)})$ and proves exponential tail bounds via a dominant pole and the parameters $z_*$ and $j_0$, offering a principled way to assess consensus timing. The results illuminate how delays and adversarial blocks shape confirmation times and provide quantitative benchmarks applicable to real-world settings like grocery supply chains that require timely consensus.
Abstract
We investigate the time to consensus in Nakamoto blockchains. Specifically, we consider two competing growth processes, labeled \emph{honest} and \emph{adversarial}, and determine the time after which the honest process permananetly exceeds the adversarial process. This is done via queueing techniques. The predominant difficulty is that the honest growth process is subject to \emph{random delays}. In a stylized Bitcoin model, we compute the Laplace transform for the time to consensus and verify it via simulation.
