Honesty over Accuracy: Trustworthy Language Models through Reinforced Hesitation
Mohamad Amin Mohamadi, Tianhao Wang, Zhiyuan Li
TL;DR
High-stakes language tasks demand epistemic prudence; standard RLVR training rewards any answer and fails to incentivize abstention. Reinforced Hesitation (RH) introduces a ternary reward (+1 for correct, 0 for abstain, -λ for wrong) that encodes the cost of errors and yields a risk-aware boundary at $\lambda/(1+\lambda)$. Across Knights & Knaves puzzles, RH reveals a Pareto frontier of specialized models and enables two inference strategies—cascading and self-cascading—that convert hesitation into productive coordination, achieving high conditional accuracy with dramatically reduced verification. This work reframes abstention as a first-class objective, enabling trustworthy collaboration between AI systems and humans and offering scalable approaches to reduce compute while managing error costs in real-world deployments.
Abstract
Modern language models fail a fundamental requirement of trustworthy intelligence: knowing when not to answer. Despite achieving impressive accuracy on benchmarks, these models produce confident hallucinations, even when wrong answers carry catastrophic consequences. Our evaluations on GSM8K, MedQA and GPQA show frontier models almost never abstain despite explicit warnings of severe penalties, suggesting that prompts cannot override training that rewards any answer over no answer. As a remedy, we propose Reinforced Hesitation (RH): a modification to Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) to use ternary rewards (+1 correct, 0 abstention, -$λ$ error) instead of binary. Controlled experiments on logic puzzles reveal that varying $λ$ produces distinct models along a Pareto frontier, where each training penalty yields the optimal model for its corresponding risk regime: low penalties produce aggressive answerers, high penalties conservative abstainers. We then introduce two inference strategies that exploit trained abstention as a coordination signal: cascading routes queries through models with decreasing risk tolerance, while self-cascading re-queries the same model on abstention. Both outperform majority voting with lower computational cost. These results establish abstention as a first-class training objective that transforms ``I don't know'' from failure into a coordination signal, enabling models to earn trust through calibrated honesty about their limits.
