On Multi-Level Apportionment
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Steven Wijaya
TL;DR
The paper generalizes classical apportionment to multi-level hierarchies by modeling entitlements on a rooted tree and enforcing upper and lower quotas relative to ancestors. It proves that allocations exist satisfying both quotas, and shows that level-by-level implementations of Adams' (upper quota) and Jefferson's (lower quota) methods preserve their respective quota properties with house monotonicity. The quota method is extended to multi-level settings but cannot guarantee both quotas simultaneously in general, prompting the Upper-Compliant Quota variant and highlighting open questions about joint guarantees. An extensive empirical study on binary and sparse 4-ary trees illustrates performance trade-offs among methods and provides practical guidance, complemented by available code.
Abstract
Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of apportionment where the groups form a hierarchical structure, which gives rise to stronger versions of the upper and lower quota notions. We show that running Adams' method level-by-level satisfies upper quota, while running Jefferson's method or the quota method level-by-level guarantees lower quota. Moreover, we prove that both quota notions can always be fulfilled simultaneously.
