Confidence is Not Competence
Debdeep Sanyal, Manya Pandey, Dhruv Kumar, Saurabh Deshpande, Murari Mandal
TL;DR
The paper investigates why LLMs’ expressed confidence often misaligns with actual problem-solving ability. It identifies a latent solvability belief that is linearly decodable across models and tasks, but resides in a high-dimensional pre-generative assessment space, while the actual reasoning unfolds on a lower-dimensional execution space. Through causal interventions, belief can be flipped without changing final performance, revealing a robust inertness and supporting a Two Brains architecture (Assessment vs Execution). The work implies that improving AI reliability requires targeting the procedural dynamics of execution rather than manipulating high-level confidence signals, with implications for mechanistic audits and safer AI design.
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit a puzzling disconnect between their asserted confidence and actual problem-solving competence. We offer a mechanistic account of this decoupling by analyzing the geometry of internal states across two phases - pre-generative assessment and solution execution. A simple linear probe decodes the internal "solvability belief" of a model, revealing a well-ordered belief axis that generalizes across model families and across math, code, planning, and logic tasks. Yet, the geometries diverge - although belief is linearly decodable, the assessment manifold has high linear effective dimensionality as measured from the principal components, while the subsequent reasoning trace evolves on a much lower-dimensional manifold. This sharp reduction in geometric complexity from thought to action mechanistically explains the confidence-competence gap. Causal interventions that steer representations along the belief axis leave final solutions unchanged, indicating that linear nudges in the complex assessment space do not control the constrained dynamics of execution. We thus uncover a two-system architecture - a geometrically complex assessor feeding a geometrically simple executor. These results challenge the assumption that decodable beliefs are actionable levers, instead arguing for interventions that target the procedural dynamics of execution rather than the high-level geometry of assessment.
