An Experimental Study of Trojan Vulnerabilities in UAV Autonomous Landing
Reza Ahmari, Ahmad Mohammadi, Vahid Hemmati, Mohammed Mynuddin, Mahmoud Nabil Mahmoud, Parham Kebria, Abdollah Homaifar, Mehrdad Saif
TL;DR
The paper investigates Trojan backdoor vulnerabilities in CNN-based autonomous UAV landing systems within Urban Air Mobility by conducting an empirical study on a DroNet-based framework using a self-collected landing-pad dataset with embedded triggers. It outlines a four-phase methodology (data collection, preparation, training, testing) and demonstrates a substantial performance degradation, with landing-zone accuracy dropping from $96.4\%$ to $73.3\%$ under Trojan activation. The results reveal concrete safety risks posed by backdoor attacks and provide a framework for evaluating Trojan vulnerability in real-time UAAV deployments, highlighting the need for lightweight detection and prevention strategies. Overall, the work contributes to securing UAM operations by quantifying Trojan risks and laying groundwork for resilient deep-learning-based navigation and landing systems.
Abstract
This study investigates the vulnerabilities of autonomous navigation and landing systems in Urban Air Mobility (UAM) vehicles. Specifically, it focuses on Trojan attacks that target deep learning models, such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). Trojan attacks work by embedding covert triggers within a model's training data. These triggers cause specific failures under certain conditions, while the model continues to perform normally in other situations. We assessed the vulnerability of Urban Autonomous Aerial Vehicles (UAAVs) using the DroNet framework. Our experiments showed a significant drop in accuracy, from 96.4% on clean data to 73.3% on data triggered by Trojan attacks. To conduct this study, we collected a custom dataset and trained models to simulate real-world conditions. We also developed an evaluation framework designed to identify Trojan-infected models. This work demonstrates the potential security risks posed by Trojan attacks and lays the groundwork for future research on enhancing the resilience of UAM systems.
