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On the cybersecurity of LoRaWAN-based system: a Smart-Lighting case study

Florian Hofer, Barbara Russo

TL;DR

This paper tackles cybersecurity in a LoRaWAN-based Smart-Lighting Architecture by performing iterative in-vitro and on-site experiments with multiple gateways. It systematically tests vulnerability classes (interference, exhaustion, protocol misconfigurations) and shows that most attacks are ineffective, though near-field jamming and misconfigurations can degrade performance. A key insight is that gateway redundancy and careful data-rate control markedly enhance resilience, while ABP join floods and protocol violations remain practical concerns. The study suggests practical hardening measures and future work to scale to 1000+ nodes and apply AI-driven parameter optimization to sustain security and performance in dense LoRaWAN deployments.

Abstract

Cyber-physical systems and the Internet of Things (IoT) are key technologies in the Industry 4.0 vision. They incorporate sensors and actuators to interact with the physical environment. However, when creating and interconnecting components to form a heterogeneous smart systems architecture, these face challenges in cybersecurity. This paper presents an experimental investigation of architectural configurations for a LoRaWAN-based Smart-Lighting project, aimed at verifying and improving the system's robustness against attacks. We assess the system's robustness in a series of iterative experiments conducted both in-vitro and on-site. The results show that most attacks on a LoRaWAN network are unsuccessful, also highlighting unresolved issues with the installed products. The most successful attacks are high-power jamming attacks within a few meters of the target, which, in the case of gateways, can be mitigated through gateway redundancy.

On the cybersecurity of LoRaWAN-based system: a Smart-Lighting case study

TL;DR

This paper tackles cybersecurity in a LoRaWAN-based Smart-Lighting Architecture by performing iterative in-vitro and on-site experiments with multiple gateways. It systematically tests vulnerability classes (interference, exhaustion, protocol misconfigurations) and shows that most attacks are ineffective, though near-field jamming and misconfigurations can degrade performance. A key insight is that gateway redundancy and careful data-rate control markedly enhance resilience, while ABP join floods and protocol violations remain practical concerns. The study suggests practical hardening measures and future work to scale to 1000+ nodes and apply AI-driven parameter optimization to sustain security and performance in dense LoRaWAN deployments.

Abstract

Cyber-physical systems and the Internet of Things (IoT) are key technologies in the Industry 4.0 vision. They incorporate sensors and actuators to interact with the physical environment. However, when creating and interconnecting components to form a heterogeneous smart systems architecture, these face challenges in cybersecurity. This paper presents an experimental investigation of architectural configurations for a LoRaWAN-based Smart-Lighting project, aimed at verifying and improving the system's robustness against attacks. We assess the system's robustness in a series of iterative experiments conducted both in-vitro and on-site. The results show that most attacks on a LoRaWAN network are unsuccessful, also highlighting unresolved issues with the installed products. The most successful attacks are high-power jamming attacks within a few meters of the target, which, in the case of gateways, can be mitigated through gateway redundancy.
Paper Structure (21 sections, 6 figures, 3 tables)

This paper contains 21 sections, 6 figures, 3 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related work
  3. Experiment setup and configuration
  4. Hardware and Software configuration
  5. LoRaWAN parameters
  6. Experimentation
  7. Attacks for vulnerability exploitation
  8. Tuning indirect interference
  9. Indirect interference
  10. Indirect interference at a distance
  11. Tuning direct interference
  12. Intentional obstruction
  13. Channel exhaustion
  14. Gateway exhaustion
  15. Network exhaustion
  16. ...and 6 more sections

Figures (6)

  • Figure 1: Experiment (re)design and execution method
  • Figure 2: Experiment setup with backhaul (BH), gateway (GW), firewall (FW), and TestBox configurations.
  • Figure 3: LoRa indirect interference tests, in-vitro.
  • Figure 4: Effect of close-by or 10 m distant interfering LoRa signals and changing downlink receive window, 16 bytes.
  • Figure 5: End node obstruction efficacy with varying SF and CR (a), varying payload (b), or interferer protocol (c).
  • ...and 1 more figures