The Tail Tells All: Estimating Model-Level Membership Inference Vulnerability Without Reference Models
Euodia Dodd, Nataša Krčo, Igor Shilov, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye
TL;DR
This work tackles the practicality gap in evaluating membership inference risk by proposing a reference-free metric for model-level vulnerability. It demonstrates that loss distributions are heavy-tailed and that vulnerable samples are those missing from the tail, enabling the use of the LOSS TNR (and LOSS AUC) as predictors of LiRA risk without training reference models. Nonlinear fits, notably an exponential mapping, offer accurate estimates of LiRA TPR@FPR=$10^{-3}$ across diverse architectures and four image datasets, with strong results even for LLMs. The approach outperforms low-cost baselines like RMIA and baseline distribution differences, offering a scalable tool for privacy risk assessment during iterative model development.
Abstract
Membership inference attacks (MIAs) have emerged as the standard tool for evaluating the privacy risks of AI models. However, state-of-the-art attacks require training numerous, often computationally expensive, reference models, limiting their practicality. We present a novel approach for estimating model-level vulnerability, the TPR at low FPR, to membership inference attacks without requiring reference models. Empirical analysis shows loss distributions to be asymmetric and heavy-tailed and suggests that most points at risk from MIAs have moved from the tail (high-loss region) to the head (low-loss region) of the distribution after training. We leverage this insight to propose a method to estimate model-level vulnerability from the training and testing distribution alone: using the absence of outliers from the high-loss region as a predictor of the risk. We evaluate our method, the TNR of a simple loss attack, across a wide range of architectures and datasets and show it to accurately estimate model-level vulnerability to the SOTA MIA attack (LiRA). We also show our method to outperform both low-cost (few reference models) attacks such as RMIA and other measures of distribution difference. We finally evaluate the use of non-linear functions to evaluate risk and show the approach to be promising to evaluate the risk in large-language models.
