Incomplete yet existent objects: a Nuclear Meinongian approach to quantum metaphysical indeterminacy

TL;DR

The paper investigates quantum metaphysical indeterminacy through Parsons' Nuclear Meinongianism and identifies a tension: indeterminacy implies incompleteness, which in Parsons' framework entails nonexistence (IENP). Because standard quantum mechanics requires quantum objects to exist despite indeterminacy, the IENP clashes with empirical data, motivating the abandonment or modification of IENP. The authors argue that to preserve a Meinongian account of quantum ontology, one must revise Parsons' framework rather than reject quantum indeterminacy. This showcases how a naturalistic, science-informed approach can refine metaphysical theories about quantum objects and their properties.

Abstract

This article proposes a reading of quantum metaphysical indeterminacy from the perspective of Parsons' Nuclear Meinongianism. In doing so, we identify a fundamental incompatibility between a key feature of Parsons' theory and standard quantum mechanics. Our approach interprets quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness. However, this move, when combined with Parsons' framework, leads to what we term the ``Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle'' (IENP), which implausibly entails the nonexistence of quantum objects. For Meinongianism to be a suitable tool for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, this principle must be addressed. We argue for dropping the IENP and discuss the resulting metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences.