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The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain

Andrei Seoev, Leonid Gremyachikh, Anastasiia Smirnova, Yash Madhwal, Alisa Kalacheva, Dmitry Belousov, Ilia Zubov, Aleksei Smirnov, Denis Fedyanin, Vladimir Gorgadze, Yury Yanovich

TL;DR

The paper tackles high-frequency, sealed-bid MEV auctions on Polygon Atlas by introducing a PPO-based reinforcement-learning bidding agent trained in a realistic simulator that models stochastic opportunity arrivals and competition. It demonstrates that a history-conditioned agent can capture substantial profits, achieving up to 49% of available profits against existing searchers and up to 81% when replacing the market leader, outperforming static bidding strategies. The work provides practical implications for industrial participants and protocol designers by showing that adaptive, temporally-aware bidding strategies are essential under sub-second, partially observable conditions. It also outlines deployment considerations and future extensions to other MEV strategies and cross-chain opportunities.

Abstract

In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to structured auction mechanisms like Polygon Atlas has transformed MEV extraction from public bidding wars into sealed-bid competitions under extreme time constraints. While this shift reduces network congestion, it introduces complex strategic challenges where searchers must make optimal bidding decisions within a sub-second window without knowledge of competitor behavior or presence. Traditional game-theoretic approaches struggle in this high-frequency, partially observable environment due to their reliance on complete information and static equilibrium assumptions. We present a reinforcement learning framework for MEV extraction on Polygon Atlas and make three contributions: (1) A novel simulation environment that accurately models the stochastic arrival of arbitrage opportunities and probabilistic competition in Atlas auctions; (2) A PPO-based bidding agent optimized for real-time constraints, capable of adaptive strategy formulation in continuous action spaces while maintaining production-ready inference speeds; (3) Empirical validation demonstrating our history-conditioned agent captures 49\% of available profits when deployed alongside existing searchers and 81\% when replacing the market leader, significantly outperforming static bidding strategies. Our work establishes that reinforcement learning provides a critical advantage in high-frequency MEV environments where traditional optimization methods fail, offering immediate value for industrial participants and protocol designers alike.

The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain

TL;DR

The paper tackles high-frequency, sealed-bid MEV auctions on Polygon Atlas by introducing a PPO-based reinforcement-learning bidding agent trained in a realistic simulator that models stochastic opportunity arrivals and competition. It demonstrates that a history-conditioned agent can capture substantial profits, achieving up to 49% of available profits against existing searchers and up to 81% when replacing the market leader, outperforming static bidding strategies. The work provides practical implications for industrial participants and protocol designers by showing that adaptive, temporally-aware bidding strategies are essential under sub-second, partially observable conditions. It also outlines deployment considerations and future extensions to other MEV strategies and cross-chain opportunities.

Abstract

In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to structured auction mechanisms like Polygon Atlas has transformed MEV extraction from public bidding wars into sealed-bid competitions under extreme time constraints. While this shift reduces network congestion, it introduces complex strategic challenges where searchers must make optimal bidding decisions within a sub-second window without knowledge of competitor behavior or presence. Traditional game-theoretic approaches struggle in this high-frequency, partially observable environment due to their reliance on complete information and static equilibrium assumptions. We present a reinforcement learning framework for MEV extraction on Polygon Atlas and make three contributions: (1) A novel simulation environment that accurately models the stochastic arrival of arbitrage opportunities and probabilistic competition in Atlas auctions; (2) A PPO-based bidding agent optimized for real-time constraints, capable of adaptive strategy formulation in continuous action spaces while maintaining production-ready inference speeds; (3) Empirical validation demonstrating our history-conditioned agent captures 49\% of available profits when deployed alongside existing searchers and 81\% when replacing the market leader, significantly outperforming static bidding strategies. Our work establishes that reinforcement learning provides a critical advantage in high-frequency MEV environments where traditional optimization methods fail, offering immediate value for industrial participants and protocol designers alike.
Paper Structure (12 sections, 6 figures, 1 table)

This paper contains 12 sections, 6 figures, 1 table.

Figures (6)

  • Figure 1: Empirical transaction execution flow observed in the Polygon Atlas network.
  • Figure 2: End-to-end architecture of a professional Polygon MEV searcher system, illustrating data ingestion, opportunity detection, strategy formulation, execution pipeline, and sealed-bid submission mechanics.
  • Figure 3: Weekly statistics on unique MEV searchers, showing consistent participation from 5-8 core entities with occasional peripheral activity.
  • Figure 4: Temporal activity patterns of a professional searcher's addresses, showing parallel bot deployment, operational timeline, and bid escalation patterns. Address annotations indicate mean bribe percentage and participation count.
  • Figure 5: Bribe percentage distribution by protocol type, showing inverse relationship between opportunity frequency and mean bid amount. Complex protocols attract fewer but more aggressive bidders.
  • ...and 1 more figures