TBRD: TESLA Authenticated UAS Broadcast Remote ID

TL;DR

This work tackles the lack of authentication in FAA Remote ID broadcasts by proposing TBRD, a TESLA-based authentication system that leverages mobile TEEs for secure key management and introduces an observer-verified USS mechanism for offline validation. The design enables lightweight, scalable message authentication compatible with ASTM F3411-22a, while supporting open and evolving UAS populations through delayed key disclosure. A proof-of-concept implementation built on OpenDroneID demonstrates practical integration, and a 4-UAS swarm simulation shows TBRD reduces authentication overhead by about 50% and accelerates signing time by roughly 100×, while mitigating spoofing, replay, and relay attacks. Overall, TBRD offers a standards-aligned, deployable solution for regulatory and operational Remote ID security in current and future UAS deployments.

Abstract

Mysterious sightings of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) over U.S. military facilities, suburban neighborhoods, and commercial airports have intensified scrutiny of drone activity. To increase accountability, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced a Remote ID mandate, requiring unmanned aircraft to broadcast their location, operator's location, and identity in real-time. However, current standards leave authentication mechanisms underspecified, enabling spoofing, relay, and replay attacks that can undermine surveillance efforts and potentially disrupt UAS-to-UAS coordination in future deployments. In this paper, we propose TBRD, a practical system for authenticating Remote ID messages in a manner that aligns with existing standards and UAS capabilities. TBRD leverages the TESLA protocol and mobile device TEEs, and introduces a verification mechanism to build a lightweight, mission-scoped authentication system that is both computationally efficient and requires a low communication footprint. We evaluate the performance of TBRD using both an FAA-requirements compatible proof-of-concept implementation for performance metrics and a simulated 4-drone swarm mission scenario to demonstrate its security guarantees under adversarial conditions. Our system provides a 50\% reduction in authentication overhead compared to digital signatures and a 100x reduction in computation time. Our results demonstrate that TBRD can be integrated into current Remote ID infrastructures to provide a scalable, standards-compliant message authentication for both regulatory and operational use cases.

Figures (9)

• Figure 1: An attacker intercepts Remote ID broadcasts from a legitimate UAS to include Basic ID, Location/Vector, and Operator ID messages. The attacker uses these legitimate transmissions to mask its digital identity in an effort to confuse and disrupt counter-UAS operations.
• Figure 2: TBRD System Diagram. Components, including the UAS, mobile device, TEE, and USS, and how they interact to secure Remote ID broadcasts.
• Figure 3: TESLA key chain generation. Keys are generated in reverse order of key disclosure and message authentication.
• Figure 4: OpenDroneID application displaying the authentication messages transmitted by our proposed system, demonstrating successful message reception and validation on standard Remote ID monitoring devices.
• Figure 5: Definition of a permissible transmission window within each key interval. This is the period where Wi-Fi beacon broadcasts are authorized to ensure a balance between system functionality and security requirements.