Thinking Longer, Not Always Smarter: Evaluating LLM Capabilities in Hierarchical Legal Reasoning
Li Zhang, Matthias Grabmair, Morgan Gray, Kevin Ashley
TL;DR
This paper introduces a formal, three-task framework to evaluate LLMs on hierarchical, case-based legal reasoning using a factor-based representation and a CATO-style knowledge hierarchy to identify significant distinctions between a current case and a precedent. It defines Task 1 (identify distinctions), Task 2 (analyze argumentative roles via hierarchy), and Task 3 (identify significant distinctions) with a symbolic ground-truth solver and an evaluation pipeline. Empirically, surface-level accuracy remains high while hierarchical reasoning (Task 2) and integrated analysis (Task 3) degrade, and thinking-enabled models improve performance at the cost of greater reasoning tokens, revealing a disconnect between computational effort and correctness. The results underscore fundamental limitations of current reasoning LLMs for legal analysis and offer a rigorous framework to diagnose and guide the development of more robust, trustworthy legal AI systems.
Abstract
Case-based reasoning is a cornerstone of U.S. legal practice, requiring professionals to argue about a current case by drawing analogies to and distinguishing from past precedents. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities, their proficiency in this complex, nuanced form of reasoning needs further investigation. We propose a formal framework that decomposes the process of identifying significant distinctions between cases into three-stage reasoning tasks. Our framework models cases using factual predicates called factors, organizes them into a legal knowledge hierarchy, and defines verifiable rules for identifying distinctions, analyzing their argumentative support, and evaluating their significance. Through comprehensive evaluation of modern reasoning LLMs, we reveal a paradox: while models achieve high accuracy on surface-level reasoning (Task 1), performance degrades on hierarchical reasoning (Task 2: 64.82%-92.09%) and collapses on integrated analysis (Task 3: 11.46%-33.99%). Most strikingly, we find that models consistently expend more computational resources on incorrect responses than correct ones, suggesting that "thinking longer" does not always mean "thinking smarter." Our work provides a methodology for fine-grained analysis of LLM reasoning capabilities in complex domains and reveals fundamental limitations that must be addressed for robust and trustworthy legal AI.
