Space Logistics Analysis and Incentive Design for Commercialization of Orbital Debris Remediation
Asaad Abdul-Hamid, Brycen D. Pearl, Hang Woon Lee, Hao Chen
TL;DR
The paper addresses the rising problem of orbital debris by proposing an integrated framework that couples a time-expanded space logistics network for remediation cost optimization, a NEAT-based benefit model to quantify avoided risks, and a Nash bargaining–based incentive design to share the remediation surplus between debris remediators and space operators. It analyzes three remediation methods—controlled reentry, uncontrolled reentry, and recycling—and evaluates the top 50 debris objects in LEO, demonstrating positive surplus under various scenarios. The work provides a quantitative basis for public–private partnerships and policy design to enable a safe, sustainable, and profitable space economy, and highlights sensitivity to launch costs, recycling feasibility, and debris-years prevented. Overall, the framework offers actionable insight into when and how private entities can participate in orbital debris remediation, guided by optimized logistics and shared incentives.
Abstract
As orbital debris continues to become a higher priority for the space industry, there is a need to explore how partnerships between the public and private space sector may aid in addressing this issue. This research develops a space logistics framework for planning orbital debris remediation missions, providing a quantitative basis for partnerships that are mutually beneficial between space operators and debris remediators. By integrating network-based space logistics and game theory, we illuminate the high-level costs of remediating orbital debris, and the surplus that stands to be shared as a result. These findings indicate significant progress toward the continued development of a safe, sustainable, and profitable space economy.
