Coupled opinion-environmental dynamics in polarized and prejudiced populations

TL;DR

This paper develops a stylized coupled human-environment system that integrates social susceptibility, personal prejudice, and experiential factors to drive opinion dynamics and environmental outcomes in polarized populations. By reducing the high-dimensional CHES dynamics to a polarization manifold, it analytically characterizes conditions for polarization, consensus, and cyclic behavior across regimes defined by the relative cost of mitigation $\beta$ and maximum emissions $\alpha$, revealing that even mild prejudice sustains polarization and shifts fixed points toward weighted averages of prejudice and objective best response. The results show that prejudice governs long-term polarization and dampens the environmental impact of policy via insensitivity to mitigation costs, while cyclic dynamics and threshold boundaries depend on the prejudice-to-objectivity ratio $q$ and confidence bound $r$. These findings offer a framework for anticipating when reducing costs or emissions will be effective and highlight the importance of addressing cognitive-social structures to achieve environmental action in polarized populations.

Abstract

Public opinion on environmental issues remains polarized in many countries, posing a significant barrier to the implementation of effective policies. Behind this polarization, empirical studies have identified social susceptibility, personal prejudice, and personal experience as dominant factors in opinion formation on environmental issues. However, current coupled human-environment models have not yet incorporated all three factors in polarized populations. We developed a stylized coupled human-environment model to investigate how social susceptibility, personal prejudice, and personal experience shape opinion formation and the environment in polarized populations. Using analytical and numerical methods, we characterized the conditions under which polarization, consensus, opinion changes, and cyclic dynamics emerge depending on the costs of mitigation, environmental damage, and the factors influencing opinion formation. Our model shows that prejudice is the key driver of persistent polarization, with even slightly prejudiced populations maintaining indefinite polarization independent of their level of objectivity. We predict that polarization can be reduced by decreasing the role of prejudice or increasing the willingness to consider opposing opinions. Finally, our model shows that cost reduction methods are less effective at reducing environmental impact in prejudiced populations. Our model generates thresholds for when reducing costs or emissions is more useful depending on the factors which influence the population's opinion formation. Overall, our model provides a framework for investigating the importance of cognitive and social structures in determining human-environment dynamics.

Figures (6)

• Figure 1: Long-term behavior of polarization. Long-term behavior of the polarization $P(t) = |a(t) - b(t)|$ between the opinion groups over the strength of prejudice ($\lambda\omega$) and the confidence bound ($r$). The sharp line represents the theoretical threshold ($r = \frac{\lambda\omega}{1-\lambda(1-\omega)}$) separating the regions of high and low polarization described in Proposition 2.
• Figure 1: Validation of fixed point expressions. Overlay of the derived expressions for fixed points and long-term behavior with numerical bifurcation diagrams over the relative cost of mitigation ($\theta$). Expressions show alignment in populations with (a) no prejudice ($q = 0$), (b) equal prejudice and objectivity ($q = 0.5$), and (c) high levels of prejudice ($q=0.9$).
• Figure 2: Long-term behavior over the cost-emissions parameter space. Effect of the net cost of mitigation ($\beta$) and the maximum emission rate ($\alpha$) on the level of pollutant and average opinion in the population. Heat maps visualize the long-term behavior in populations with (a) no prejudice ($q = 0$), (b) equal prejudice and objectivity ($q = 0.5$), and (c) high levels of prejudice ($q=0.9$). In each case, the behavior is separated into three regions (mitigative, cyclic, and non-mitigative regions) dependent on the angle to the $\beta$-axis, $\theta = tan^{-1}(\frac{\alpha}{\beta\gamma})$. This behavior is constant along lines from the origin in the $(\beta, \alpha)$ parameter space shown in (a-c).
• Figure 2: Effect of influence coefficients on the level of pollutant. Heatmap of the long-term level of pollutant over varying strengths of social susceptibility, prejudice, and objectivity of the population. Simulations were performed at $\alpha = 0.8, \beta = 5, \gamma = 0.2$.
• Figure 3: Long-term behavior of the opinion-environmental system over the relative cost of mitigation ($\theta$). Bifurcation diagrams over ($\theta$) visualize the fixed points and behaviors of the level of pollutant and opinion profile in the mitigative, non-mitigative, and cyclic regions in populations with (a) no prejudice ($q = 0$), (b) equal prejudice and objectivity ($q = 0.5$), and (c) high levels of prejudice ($q=0.9$).