Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches
Hachem Madmoun, Salem Lahlou
TL;DR
This study compares two approaches to eliciting cooperation among multi-agent LLMs: direct, minimal communication via a one-word channel and a curriculum-based in-context learning strategy. In a 4-player Stag Hunt, cheap talk dramatically boosts cooperation in heterogeneous model groups, rising from 0% to 48.3%, illustrating a robust coordination mechanism. Conversely, curriculum learning for social dilemmas proves highly design-sensitive and can degrade performance by approximately 27% in an iterated public goods task, with qualitative analysis revealing learned pessimism and heuristic over-fitting as failure modes. The results imply that simple communication protocols may offer more reliable coordination than experience-based curricula in social dilemmas, while curriculum design requires careful alignment of strategic lessons to the target context.
Abstract
Eliciting cooperation in multi-agent LLM systems is critical for AI alignment. We investigate two approaches: direct communication and curriculum learning. In a 4-player Stag Hunt, a one-word "cheap talk" channel increases cooperation from 0% to 48.3%, demonstrating communication as a robust coordination mechanism. In contrast, we find that curriculum learning is highly sensitive to design choices: our pedagogical curriculum through progressively complex games reduced agent payoffs by 27.4% in an Iterated Public Goods Game with Punishment. Qualitative analysis reveals that curricula emphasizing defection-equilibrium games can induce "learned pessimism" in agents. These findings suggest that for coordination problems, simple communication protocols may be more reliable than experience-based training, and that curriculum design for social dilemmas requires careful attention to the strategic lessons embedded in game sequences.
