Two Wrongs Make One Right
Michele Pizzochero
TL;DR
The paper analyzes why science is empirically successful through the realism-antirealism debate, using Drude's classical theory of metals and the Wiedemann-Franz law as a case study. It argues that Drude's correct prediction of the Lorenz number arises not from an approximately true description of electrons but from a fortuitous cancellation of large errors in velocity and heat capacity, challenging the view that success tracks truth. It draws three lessons about coincidences, the non-monotonic relationship between truth and predictive success, and potential synergies with antirealist accounts such as predictive similarity. The discussion extends to the Sommerfeld puzzle, evaluating structural realism as a possible defense and concluding that multiple explanatory routes—coincidence, predictive similarity, and selective realism—may jointly account for scientific success without requiring universal truth-claims about all theories.
Abstract
An influential argument for scientific realism posits that, if scientific theories were not true, their empirical success would be a coincidence. Here, I show that the false Drude's theory succeeds in explaining the Wiedemann-Franz law by coincidence--a fortuitous compensation of errors.
