Deontic Argumentation
Guido Governatori, Antonino Rotolo
TL;DR
The paper tackles the problem of modeling weak permission within deontic argumentation, showing that grounded semantics fail when two obligations conflict. It introduces Deontic Argumentation Theory and, more broadly, a wp-semantics based on Defeasible Logic that distinguishes imaginary (weak-permission) and natural arguments, defines wp-acceptable/wp-rejected notions, and constructs a unique, conflict-free wp-extension. The results demonstrate that the wp-semantics can justify weak permission in cases where conflicts remain unresolved under grounding, while remaining an extension of grounded semantics. This framework advances rigorous deontic reasoning for legal and normative domains and suggests avenues for integrating with neighbourhood semantics and DDL.
Abstract
We address the issue of defining a semantics for deontic argumentation that supports weak permission. Some recent results show that grounded semantics do not support weak permission when there is a conflict between two obligations. We provide a definition of Deontic Argumentation Theory that accounts for weak permission, and we recall the result about grounded semantics. Then, we propose a new semantics that supports weak permission.