Voting-Based Semi-Parallel Proof-of-Work Protocol
Mustafa Doger, Sennur Ulukus
TL;DR
The paper tackles the vulnerability of Nakamoto consensus to incentive attacks by evaluating parallel PoW schemes and introducing a voting-based semi-parallel PoW protocol. The proposed design separates proofs from ledgers, employs ledger elections based on transaction-fee incentives, and uses a heaviest-aggregate-work fork rule with semi-sequential parallelism to reduce overhead and conflicts. Through theoretical analysis and MDР-based simulations, it demonstrates improved resistance to double-spending, more stable rewards, and fair fee distribution, while maintaining practicality in communication and throughput. The work advances the state of PoW protocols by offering a hybrid approach that mitigates incentive attacks and enhances scalability, with clear pathways for implementation and extension.
Abstract
Parallel Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocols are suggested to improve the safety guarantees, transaction throughput and confirmation latencies of Nakamoto consensus. In this work, we first consider the existing parallel PoW protocols and develop hard-coded incentive attack structures. Our theoretical results and simulations show that the existing parallel PoW protocols are more vulnerable to incentive attacks than the Nakamoto consensus, e.g., attacks have smaller profitability threshold and they result in higher relative rewards. Next, we introduce a voting-based semi-parallel PoW protocol that outperforms both Nakamoto consensus and the existing parallel PoW protocols from most practical perspectives such as communication overheads, throughput, transaction conflicts, incentive compatibility of the protocol as well as a fair distribution of transaction fees among the voters and the leaders. We use state-of-the-art analysis to evaluate the consistency of the protocol and consider Markov decision process (MDP) models to substantiate our claims about the resilience of our protocol against incentive attacks.
