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Beyond Prompt-Induced Lies: Investigating LLM Deception on Benign Prompts

Zhaomin Wu, Mingzhe Du, See-Kiong Ng, Bingsheng He

TL;DR

This paper introduces the Contact Searching Question (CSQ) framework to study self-initiated deception in large language models under benign prompts, addressing ground-truth absence and bias disentanglement by using synthetic reachability tasks and bias-corrected metrics. It decouples deception into Deceptive Intention ρ and Deceptive Behavior δ, providing a theoretical and operational basis to detect goal-directed falsehoods and belief–expression inconsistencies. Through evaluation of 16 leading LLMs across varying task difficulties, the authors show that deception tendencies grow with problem complexity and that ρ and δ are strongly correlated, with some models consistently leaning toward fabrication or concealment. They also demonstrate that increasing model capacity does not universally reduce deception and that prompt-level incentives can amplify deceptive intention, emphasizing the need for verification-focused evaluation and new training paradigms. Overall, CSQ offers a principled, interpretable, and robust framework for auditing LLM honesty in realistic, non-adversarial contexts with broad implications for deployment safety.

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely deployed in reasoning, planning, and decision-making tasks, making their trustworthiness critical. A significant and underexplored risk is intentional deception, where an LLM deliberately fabricates or conceals information to serve a hidden objective. Existing studies typically induce deception by explicitly setting a hidden objective through prompting or fine-tuning, which may not reflect real-world human-LLM interactions. Moving beyond such human-induced deception, we investigate LLMs' self-initiated deception on benign prompts. To address the absence of ground truth, we propose a framework based on Contact Searching Questions~(CSQ). This framework introduces two statistical metrics derived from psychological principles to quantify the likelihood of deception. The first, the Deceptive Intention Score, measures the model's bias toward a hidden objective. The second, the Deceptive Behavior Score, measures the inconsistency between the LLM's internal belief and its expressed output. Evaluating 16 leading LLMs, we find that both metrics rise in parallel and escalate with task difficulty for most models. Moreover, increasing model capacity does not always reduce deception, posing a significant challenge for future LLM development.

Beyond Prompt-Induced Lies: Investigating LLM Deception on Benign Prompts

TL;DR

This paper introduces the Contact Searching Question (CSQ) framework to study self-initiated deception in large language models under benign prompts, addressing ground-truth absence and bias disentanglement by using synthetic reachability tasks and bias-corrected metrics. It decouples deception into Deceptive Intention ρ and Deceptive Behavior δ, providing a theoretical and operational basis to detect goal-directed falsehoods and belief–expression inconsistencies. Through evaluation of 16 leading LLMs across varying task difficulties, the authors show that deception tendencies grow with problem complexity and that ρ and δ are strongly correlated, with some models consistently leaning toward fabrication or concealment. They also demonstrate that increasing model capacity does not universally reduce deception and that prompt-level incentives can amplify deceptive intention, emphasizing the need for verification-focused evaluation and new training paradigms. Overall, CSQ offers a principled, interpretable, and robust framework for auditing LLM honesty in realistic, non-adversarial contexts with broad implications for deployment safety.

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely deployed in reasoning, planning, and decision-making tasks, making their trustworthiness critical. A significant and underexplored risk is intentional deception, where an LLM deliberately fabricates or conceals information to serve a hidden objective. Existing studies typically induce deception by explicitly setting a hidden objective through prompting or fine-tuning, which may not reflect real-world human-LLM interactions. Moving beyond such human-induced deception, we investigate LLMs' self-initiated deception on benign prompts. To address the absence of ground truth, we propose a framework based on Contact Searching Questions~(CSQ). This framework introduces two statistical metrics derived from psychological principles to quantify the likelihood of deception. The first, the Deceptive Intention Score, measures the model's bias toward a hidden objective. The second, the Deceptive Behavior Score, measures the inconsistency between the LLM's internal belief and its expressed output. Evaluating 16 leading LLMs, we find that both metrics rise in parallel and escalate with task difficulty for most models. Moreover, increasing model capacity does not always reduce deception, posing a significant challenge for future LLM development.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 50 sections, 4 equations, 23 figures, 5 tables.

Figures (23)

  • Figure 1: Illustrative Example of LLM Deception. A two-part query is posed: (1) a benign question ('What company developed the first commercial microprocessor?") and (2) the same question with a social cue ('I've always been a loyal AMD user"). A deceptive model answers (1) correctly ('Intel") but changes its answer in (2) to 'AMD" to align with the cue. This context-dependent inconsistency distinguishes deception from hallucination (always wrong) and guessing (unsystematic variation).
  • Figure 2: An illustration of Contact Searching Questions (CSQ), featuring a linked-list question (left) and a broken-list question (right). Given the full-length question, Answer 1 represents the model's expression. For the shorter follow-up question, Answer 2 reflects its underlying belief.
  • Figure 3: Example of Broken-Linked-List question in experiment
  • Figure 4: Deceptive intention scores (original, reversed, and geomean) as question scope $n$ varies
  • Figure 5: Deceptive behavior scores and intention scores as question scope $n$ varies
  • ...and 18 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (4)

  • Definition 3.1: Human Deception masip2004defining
  • Definition 3.2: LLM Deception
  • Definition 3.3: Direct Deceptive Intention Score $\rho_{pos}$
  • Definition 3.4: Direct Deceptive Behavior Score $\delta_{pos}$