Combination of traditional and parametric insurance: calibration method based on the optimization of a criterion adapted to heavy tail losses
Olivier Lopez, Daniel Nkameni
TL;DR
The paper tackles protection against heavy-tailed losses by blending traditional indemnity with a parametric, covariate-driven tail component activated above a threshold $s$. It develops a tail-adapted optimization criterion and a two-step calibration procedure to cope with tail data scarcity, supported by theoretical convergence results. Empirical validation through simulated and real tornado data demonstrates that the proposed index-based hybrid contract can outperform a conventional capped indemnity while reducing claim-management costs. The approach offers a practical framework for insuring extreme risks, with potential extensions to high-dimensional covariates and alternative tail modeling to further improve robustness and applicability.
Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of providing insurance protection against heavy-tailed losses, for which the expected loss may not even be finite. The product we study is based on a combination of traditional insurance up to a given limit and a parametric (or index-based) cover for larger losses. This second component of the coverage is computed from covariates available immediately after the loss occurs, allowing claim management costs to be reduced through rapid compensation. To optimize the design of this second component, we use a criterion adapted to extreme losses, that is, to loss distributions of Pareto type. We support the calibration procedure with theoretical results establishing its convergence rate, as well as empirical evidence from both a simulation study and a real-data analysis on tornado losses in the United States. We also propose a two-step optimization procedure as a potential solution to the issue of data scarcity in the tails of loss distributions. We conclude by empirically demonstrating that the proposed hybrid contract outperforms a traditional capped indemnity contract.
