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The Query Complexity of Uniform Pricing

Houshuang Chen, Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Chihao Zhang

TL;DR

The paper investigates the query complexity and regret of Uniform Pricing in a multi-buyer setting, showing that distributional structure (regularity or MHR) does not yield learning advantages when at least two distributions are present. It develops a unified information-theoretic framework, leveraging base-plus-hard-instance constructions and a pricing-to-identification reduction to prove near-tight lower bounds. Specifically, for two regular or three MHR distributions, both pricing query complexity and minimax regret match the general-case bounds, at $\widetilde{\Theta}(\varepsilon^{-3})$ and $\widetilde{\Theta}(T^{2/3})$ respectively; for two MHR distributions, the bounds are $\Omega(\varepsilon^{-5/2})$ and $\Omega(T^{3/5})$, with small gaps to the general bounds. These results reveal a dichotomy between single-agent and multi-agent environments in mechanism design, indicating that competition among buyers erases the benefits of distributional structure on learning efficiency and suggesting the need for robust pricing strategies in multi-distribution markets.

Abstract

Real-world pricing mechanisms are typically optimized using training data, a setting corresponding to the $\textit{pricing query complexity}$ problem in Mechanism Design. The previous work (LSTW23, SODA) studies the $\textit{single-distribution}$ case, with tight bounds of $\widetildeΘ(\varepsilon^{-3})$ for a $\textit{general}$ distribution and $\widetildeΘ(\varepsilon^{-2})$ for either a $\textit{regular}$ or $\textit{monotone-hazard-rate (MHR)}$ distribution. This can be directly interpreted as ''the query complexity of the $\textsf{Uniform Pricing}$ mechanism, in the $\textit{single-distribution}$ case''. Yet in the $\textit{multi-distribution}$ case, can the regularity and MHR conditions still lead to improvements over the tight bound $\widetildeΘ(\varepsilon^{-3})$ for general distributions? We answer this question in the negative, by establishing a (near-)matching lower bound $Ω(\varepsilon^{-3})$ for either $\textit{two regular distributions}$ or $\textit{three MHR distributions}$. We also address the $\textit{regret minimization}$ problem and, in comparison with the folklore upper bound $\widetilde{O}(T^{2 / 3})$ for general distributions (see, e.g., SW24, EC), establish a (near-)matching lower bound $Ω(T^{2 / 3})$ for either $\textit{two regular distributions}$ or $\textit{three MHR distributions}$, via a black-box reduction. Again, this is in stark contrast to the tight bound $\widetildeΘ(T^{1 / 2})$ for a single regular or MHR distribution.

The Query Complexity of Uniform Pricing

TL;DR

The paper investigates the query complexity and regret of Uniform Pricing in a multi-buyer setting, showing that distributional structure (regularity or MHR) does not yield learning advantages when at least two distributions are present. It develops a unified information-theoretic framework, leveraging base-plus-hard-instance constructions and a pricing-to-identification reduction to prove near-tight lower bounds. Specifically, for two regular or three MHR distributions, both pricing query complexity and minimax regret match the general-case bounds, at and respectively; for two MHR distributions, the bounds are and , with small gaps to the general bounds. These results reveal a dichotomy between single-agent and multi-agent environments in mechanism design, indicating that competition among buyers erases the benefits of distributional structure on learning efficiency and suggesting the need for robust pricing strategies in multi-distribution markets.

Abstract

Real-world pricing mechanisms are typically optimized using training data, a setting corresponding to the problem in Mechanism Design. The previous work (LSTW23, SODA) studies the case, with tight bounds of for a distribution and for either a or distribution. This can be directly interpreted as ''the query complexity of the mechanism, in the case''. Yet in the case, can the regularity and MHR conditions still lead to improvements over the tight bound for general distributions? We answer this question in the negative, by establishing a (near-)matching lower bound for either or . We also address the problem and, in comparison with the folklore upper bound for general distributions (see, e.g., SW24, EC), establish a (near-)matching lower bound for either or , via a black-box reduction. Again, this is in stark contrast to the tight bound for a single regular or MHR distribution.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 16 sections, 20 theorems, 74 equations, 1 figure.

Key Result

Theorem 7

For two (or more) regular distributions, the query complexity of Uniform Pricing is $\Omega(\varepsilon^{-3})$.

Figures (1)

  • Figure 1: Diagrams for the lower-bound construction in the "two regular distributions" setting.

Theorems & Definitions (64)

  • Definition 1: Regular Distributions M81
  • Definition 2: MHR Distributions BMP63
  • Claim 3: Jensen's Inequality CT06
  • Claim 4: Convexity of $\mathsf{KL}(p, q)$
  • proof
  • Claim 5: Upper Bounds of $\mathsf{KL}(p, q)$
  • proof
  • Claim 6: Pricing Algorithms
  • proof
  • Theorem 7
  • ...and 54 more