Image Corruption-Inspired Membership Inference Attacks against Large Vision-Language Models
Zongyu Wu, Minhua Lin, Zhiwei Zhang, Fali Wang, Xianren Zhang, Xiang Zhang, Suhang Wang
TL;DR
This work tackles privacy risks in large vision-language models by studying membership inference attacks targeting whether a specific image was used in training. It introduces ICIMIA, which exploits corruption robustness in embeddings for white-box attacks and robustness of text outputs under corruption for black-box attacks. Empirical results on VL-MIA/Flickr datasets with LLaVA-1.5 models show high AUCs (≈0.88 in white-box) and competitive black-box performance, outperforming several baselines. The findings reveal practical privacy risks in LVLM training data and highlight the need for privacy-preserving data practices and robust benchmarking in multimodal models.
Abstract
Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have demonstrated outstanding performance in many downstream tasks. However, LVLMs are trained on large-scale datasets, which can pose privacy risks if training images contain sensitive information. Therefore, it is important to detect whether an image is used to train the LVLM. Recent studies have investigated membership inference attacks (MIAs) against LVLMs, including detecting image-text pairs and single-modality content. In this work, we focus on detecting whether a target image is used to train the target LVLM. We design simple yet effective Image Corruption-Inspired Membership Inference Attacks (ICIMIA) against LVLMs, which are inspired by LVLM's different sensitivity to image corruption for member and non-member images. We first perform an MIA method under the white-box setting, where we can obtain the embeddings of the image through the vision part of the target LVLM. The attacks are based on the embedding similarity between the image and its corrupted version. We further explore a more practical scenario where we have no knowledge about target LVLMs and we can only query the target LVLMs with an image and a textual instruction. We then conduct the attack by utilizing the output text embeddings' similarity. Experiments on existing datasets validate the effectiveness of our proposed methods under those two different settings.
