Forecasting Public Sentiments via Mean Field Games
Michael V. Klibanov, Kevin McGoff, Trung Truong
TL;DR
This work develops a globally convergent numerical method for forecasting public sentiments within Mean Field Games by constructing a Carleman-weighted convexification functional J_{λ,α}. The authors prove global strong convexity on a ball for sufficiently large λ, establish Lipschitz continuity of the derivative, and derive error bounds linking initial-data inaccuracies to solution accuracy. They show global convergence of a gradient-descent scheme to the unique minimizer and validate the approach through 1D numerical experiments, including ideal, more realistic, and data-mimicking scenarios. The results demonstrate the method's potential to forecast MFG solutions from initial data with controlled error, offering a non-marching, stable alternative for inverse-type forecasting problems in social dynamics. The technique leverages Carleman estimates via a Carleman weight φ_λ and yields a robust framework for forecasting public sentiment modeled by a coupled parabolic MFG system.
Abstract
Motivated by the goal of forecasting public sentiments, we consider a forecasting problem in the context of the Mean Field Games theory. We develop a numerical method, which is a version of the so-called convexification method. We provide theoretical convergence analysis that establishes global convergence of the method with a convergence rate. We also conduct numerical experiments that demonstrate the accurate performance of the convexification technique and highlight some promising features of this approach.
