Finite-Sample Convergence Bounds for Trust Region Policy Optimization in Mean-Field Games
Antonio Ocello, Daniil Tiapkin, Lorenzo Mancini, Mathieu Laurière, Eric Moulines
TL;DR
The paper addresses computing mean-field Nash equilibria in ergodic MF-MDPs using reinforcement learning, introducing MF-TRPO. It develops two algorithms, ExactMFTRPO with non-asymptotic, finite-sample guarantees and SampleBasedMFTRPO with high-probability finite-sample guarantees, achieving a total environment interaction complexity of $\tilde{O}(1/\varepsilon^6)$ for the model-free variant. Theoretical results include a $\tilde{O}(1/L)$ convergence rate for the exact method and a controlled exploitability bound for the model-free version, together with rigorous concentration-based analysis. Empirical results on grid-based crowd modeling corroborate the theoretical findings, demonstrating stable convergence and meaningful mean-field distribution dynamics across scenarios.
Abstract
We introduce Mean-Field Trust Region Policy Optimization (MF-TRPO), a novel algorithm designed to compute approximate Nash equilibria for ergodic Mean-Field Games (MFG) in finite state-action spaces. Building on the well-established performance of TRPO in the reinforcement learning (RL) setting, we extend its methodology to the MFG framework, leveraging its stability and robustness in policy optimization. Under standard assumptions in the MFG literature, we provide a rigorous analysis of MF-TRPO, establishing theoretical guarantees on its convergence. Our results cover both the exact formulation of the algorithm and its sample-based counterpart, where we derive high-probability guarantees and finite sample complexity. This work advances MFG optimization by bridging RL techniques with mean-field decision-making, offering a theoretically grounded approach to solving complex multi-agent problems.
