Optimal Satellite Maneuvers for Spaceborne Jamming Attacks
Filippos Fotiadis, Quentin Rommel, Brian M. Sadler, Ufuk Topcu
TL;DR
The paper addresses the feasibility of spaceborne jamming against satellite uplinks by formulating a two-stage optimal-control problem in a Clohessy-Wiltshire orbital framework. It quantifies jamming impact via SINR as a function of the jammer's relative position and derives both algebraic and boundary-value solutions for repositioning and cruising phases. Simulations with a low-Earth orbit defender show that fuel-efficient maneuvers achieving small angular offsets relative to the defender can significantly degrade uplink quality, primarily through favorable antenna geometry. The work integrates communication physics, orbital mechanics, and optimal control to illuminate attack viability and motivate defensive countermeasures.
Abstract
Satellites are becoming exceedingly critical for communication, making them prime targets for cyber-physical attacks. We consider a rogue satellite in low Earth orbit that jams the uplink communication between another satellite and a ground station. To achieve maximal interference with minimal fuel consumption, the jammer carefully maneuvers itself relative to the target satellite's antenna. We cast this maneuvering objective as a two-stage optimal control problem, involving i) repositioning to an efficient jamming position before uplink communication commences; and ii) maintaining an efficient jamming position after communication has started. We obtain the optimal maneuvering trajectories for the jammer and perform simulations to show how they enable the disruption of uplink communication with reasonable fuel consumption.
