Conceptual Logical Foundations of Artificial Social Intelligence

TL;DR

This work develops a conceptual and formal foundation for artificial social intelligence by introducing the ICE architecture, where an agent’s behavior is governed by Information, Intention, Communication, Cooperation, Evaluation, and Empowerment. It connects dynamic information processing with social and strategic reasoning through dynamic possible-world semantics, situation semantics, and a robust theory of action and uncertainty in multi-agent settings. The framework unifies object-language semantics with agent-centric pragmatics, enabling agents to transform their information and intentional states via communication and cooperative planning, while quantifying entropy and utilitarian aspects of plans and organizations. The proposed theory aims to ground scalable, socially capable artificial agents in a rigorous logical and semantic core, potentially transforming how AI participates in human-like coordination and collective decision-making.

Abstract

What makes a society possible at all? How is coordination and cooperation in social activity possible? What is the minimal mental architecture of a social agent? How is the information about the state of the world related to the agents intentions? How are the intentions of agents related? What role does communication play in this coordination process? This essay explores the conceptual and logical foundations of artificial social intelligence in the context of a society of multiple agents that communicate and cooperate to achieve some end. An attempt is made to provide an introduction to some of the key concepts, their formal definitions and their interrelationships. These include the notion of a changing social world of multiple agents. The logic of social intelligence goes beyond classical logic by linking information with strategic thought. A minimal architecture of social agents is presented. The agents have different dynamically changing, possible choices and abilities. The agents also have uncertainty, lacking perfect information about their physical state as well as their dynamic social state. The social state of an agent includes the intentional state of that agent, as well as, that agent's representation of the intentional states of other agents. Furthermore, it includes the evaluations agents make of their physical and social condition. Communication, semantic and pragmatic meaning and their relationship to intention and information states are investigated. The logic of agent abilities and intentions are motivated and formalized. The entropy of group strategic states is defined.