Privacy of Groups in Dense Street Imagery
Matt Franchi, Hauke Sandhaus, Madiha Zahrah Choksi, Severin Engelmann, Wendy Ju, Helen Nissenbaum
TL;DR
Dense Street Imagery (DSI) enables real-time urban sensing, but traditional anonymization fails to protect group privacy. This paper conducts a penetration test on 25,232,608 NYC dashcam images to show how AI vision models can infer group membership despite de-identification. Using Contextual Integrity (CI) as an analytical lens, it defines a typology of identifiable groups and demonstrates concrete privacy harms, including targeted enforcement and employment risks. It concludes with policy and technical recommendations, including dataset-use approvals and context-aware obfuscation tools, to safeguard group privacy while preserving DSI's utility.
Abstract
Spatially and temporally dense street imagery (DSI) datasets have grown unbounded. In 2024, individual companies possessed around 3 trillion unique images of public streets. DSI data streams are only set to grow as companies like Lyft and Waymo use DSI to train autonomous vehicle algorithms and analyze collisions. Academic researchers leverage DSI to explore novel approaches to urban analysis. Despite good-faith efforts by DSI providers to protect individual privacy through blurring faces and license plates, these measures fail to address broader privacy concerns. In this work, we find that increased data density and advancements in artificial intelligence enable harmful group membership inferences from supposedly anonymized data. We perform a penetration test to demonstrate how easily sensitive group affiliations can be inferred from obfuscated pedestrians in 25,232,608 dashcam images taken in New York City. We develop a typology of identifiable groups within DSI and analyze privacy implications through the lens of contextual integrity. Finally, we discuss actionable recommendations for researchers working with data from DSI providers.
