Faithful and secure distributed quantum sensing under general-coherent attacks
G. Bizzarri, M. Barbieri, M. Manrique, M. Parisi, F. Bruni, I. Gianani, M. Rosati
TL;DR
Addresses faithful and secure distributed quantum sensing under general-coherent attacks. It develops a unifying theoretical framework supporting both entanglement-based and mutually unbiased bases formulations and defines faithfulness (tampering resilience) and security (information leakage). It proves robustness against collective attacks via a LOCC de Finetti approach and analyzes one-way and two-way protocols with a safety-threshold mechanism. A photonic implementation demonstrates faithfulness in practice but reveals a potential bias penalty when enforcing the safety threshold, highlighting practical trade-offs. Overall, the work advances practical, private quantum sensing networks with provable security under realistic noise and attack models.
Abstract
Quantum metrology and cryptography can be combined in a distributed and/or remote sensing setting, where distant end-users with limited quantum capabilities can employ quantum states, transmitted by a quantum-powerful provider via a quantum network, to perform quantum-enhanced parameter estimation in a private fashion. Previous works on the subject have been limited by restricted assumptions on the capabilities of a potential eavesdropper and the use of abort-based protocols that prevent a simple practical realization. Here we introduce, theoretically analyze, and experimentally demonstrate single- and two-way protocols for distributed sensing combining several unique and desirable features: (i) a safety-threshold mechanism that allows the protocol to proceed in low-noise cases and quantifying the potential tampering with respect to the ideal estimation procedure, effectively paving the way for wide-spread practical realizations; (ii) equivalence of entanglement-based and mutually-unbiased-bases-based formulations; (iii) robustness against collective attacks via a LOCC-de-Finetti theorem, for the first time to our knowledge. Finally, we demonstrate our protocols in a photonic-based implementation, observing that the possibility of guaranteeing a safety threshold may come at a significant price in terms of the estimation bias, potentially overestimating the effect of tampering in practical settings.
