A Novel Cipher for Enhancing MAVLink Security: Design, Security Analysis, and Performance Evaluation Using a Drone Testbed
Bhavya Dixit, Ananthapadmanabhan A., Adheeba Thahsin, Saketh Pathak, Gaurav S. Kasbekar, Arnab Maity
TL;DR
This work addresses the lack of confidentiality in MAVLink communications by implementing and benchmarking multiple encryption schemes on a real drone testbed, including a novel cipher named MAVShield. MAVShield modifies the Speck core to achieve low overhead in CTR mode, supported by dynamic key scheduling and non‑linear substitutions, and is evaluated against AES‑CTR, ChaCha20, Speck‑CTR, and Rabbit. The study conducts differential cryptanalysis, NIST/Diehard randomness tests, and Wireshark‑based network validation, plus real flight performance metrics, demonstrating that MAVShield offers robust security with minimal memory, CPU, and power overhead. The results indicate MAVShield is a practical and effective solution for securing MAVLink communications in real deployments, with avenues for future key‑exchange and algebraic cryptanalysis research.
Abstract
We present MAVShield, a novel lightweight cipher designed to secure communications in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) using the MAVLink protocol, which by default transmits unencrypted messages between UAVs and Ground Control Stations (GCS). While existing studies propose encryption for MAVLink, most remain theoretical or simulation-based. We implement MAVShield alongside AES-CTR, ChaCha20, Speck-CTR, and Rabbit, and evaluate them on a real drone testbed. A comprehensive security analysis using statistical test suites (NIST and Diehard) demonstrates strong resistance of the novel cipher to cryptanalysis. Performance evaluation across key metrics including memory usage, CPU load, and battery power consumption, demonstrates that MAVShield outperforms existing algorithms and offers an efficient, real-world solution for securing MAVLink communications in UAVs.
