Table of Contents
Fetching ...

Unveiling and Mitigating Adversarial Vulnerabilities in Iterative Optimizers

Elad Sofer, Tomer Shaked, Caroline Chaux, Nir Shlezinger

TL;DR

This work reveals that iterative optimizers used for inference—a class traditionally not learned from data—exhibit adversarial sensitivity similar to neural networks when cast as ML models through deep unfolding. It establishes theoretical links between the learned hyperparameters of unfolded proximal gradient and ADMM methods and the Lipschitz continuity of the update mappings, showing how adversarial perturbations effectively reshape the optimization surface and shift minima. The authors demonstrate, both theoretically (via Lipschitz bounds and a least-squares proposition) and empirically (across sparse recovery, RPCA, and hybrid beamforming), that unfolding can both expose and mitigate vulnerability: conventional training can increase sensitivity, while adversarial training of unfolded optimizers reduces it with only modest losses on clean data. The work further provides practical defense insights for signal-processing and communications applications, suggesting adversarial-aware unfolding as a scalable defense that preserves the underlying optimization structure while improving robustness.

Abstract

Machine learning (ML) models are often sensitive to carefully crafted yet seemingly unnoticeable perturbations. Such adversarial examples are considered to be a property of ML models, often associated with their black-box operation and sensitivity to features learned from data. This work examines the adversarial sensitivity of non-learned decision rules, and particularly of iterative optimizers. Our analysis is inspired by the recent developments in deep unfolding, which cast such optimizers as ML models. We show that non-learned iterative optimizers share the sensitivity to adversarial examples of ML models, and that attacking iterative optimizers effectively alters the optimization objective surface in a manner that modifies the minima sought. We then leverage the ability to cast iteration-limited optimizers as ML models to enhance robustness via adversarial training. For a class of proximal gradient optimizers, we rigorously prove how their learning affects adversarial sensitivity. We numerically back our findings, showing the vulnerability of various optimizers, as well as the robustness induced by unfolding and adversarial training.

Unveiling and Mitigating Adversarial Vulnerabilities in Iterative Optimizers

TL;DR

This work reveals that iterative optimizers used for inference—a class traditionally not learned from data—exhibit adversarial sensitivity similar to neural networks when cast as ML models through deep unfolding. It establishes theoretical links between the learned hyperparameters of unfolded proximal gradient and ADMM methods and the Lipschitz continuity of the update mappings, showing how adversarial perturbations effectively reshape the optimization surface and shift minima. The authors demonstrate, both theoretically (via Lipschitz bounds and a least-squares proposition) and empirically (across sparse recovery, RPCA, and hybrid beamforming), that unfolding can both expose and mitigate vulnerability: conventional training can increase sensitivity, while adversarial training of unfolded optimizers reduces it with only modest losses on clean data. The work further provides practical defense insights for signal-processing and communications applications, suggesting adversarial-aware unfolding as a scalable defense that preserves the underlying optimization structure while improving robustness.

Abstract

Machine learning (ML) models are often sensitive to carefully crafted yet seemingly unnoticeable perturbations. Such adversarial examples are considered to be a property of ML models, often associated with their black-box operation and sensitivity to features learned from data. This work examines the adversarial sensitivity of non-learned decision rules, and particularly of iterative optimizers. Our analysis is inspired by the recent developments in deep unfolding, which cast such optimizers as ML models. We show that non-learned iterative optimizers share the sensitivity to adversarial examples of ML models, and that attacking iterative optimizers effectively alters the optimization objective surface in a manner that modifies the minima sought. We then leverage the ability to cast iteration-limited optimizers as ML models to enhance robustness via adversarial training. For a class of proximal gradient optimizers, we rigorously prove how their learning affects adversarial sensitivity. We numerically back our findings, showing the vulnerability of various optimizers, as well as the robustness induced by unfolding and adversarial training.
Paper Structure (24 sections, 3 theorems, 27 equations, 15 figures)

This paper contains 24 sections, 3 theorems, 27 equations, 15 figures.

Key Result

Proposition 1

Consider an inference rule mapping from $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}^n$ into $\mathcal{S} = \mathbb{R}^m$, $n > m$, based on the $\ell_2$ objective of the form $\mathcal{L}_{\rm op}({\boldsymbol{x}},{\boldsymbol{s}}) = \|{\boldsymbol{x}}-{\boldsymbol{A}}{\boldsymbol{s}}\|^2_2$ for a given $n\times m$ m where, when applied to a matrix, $\| \cdot \|_2$ is the $\ell_2$ induced matrix norm, i.e., its max

Figures (15)

  • Figure 1: 2D projected loss surfaces of attacked proximal gradient descent (left) and clean proximal gradient descent (right)
  • Figure 2: Illustration of ${\boldsymbol{x}}$ and its associated ${\boldsymbol{x}}+{\boldsymbol{\delta}}$ for $\epsilon=0.025$.
  • Figure 3: ISTA ${\boldsymbol{x}}+{\boldsymbol{\delta}}$ and ${\boldsymbol{x}}$ convergence for $\epsilon=0.025$.
  • Figure 4: Distortion ${\| {\boldsymbol{s}}^{\star} - {\boldsymbol{s}}_{\rm adv}^{\star} \|}_2$ versus attack radius $\epsilon$.
  • Figure 5: Two example images (left column) decomposed into an expressionless low-rank component (middle column) and an expression sparse component (right) column using AccAltProj with clean input (upper row) and perturbed input (lower row).
  • ...and 10 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (4)

  • Proposition 1
  • Definition 1
  • Proposition 2
  • Proposition 3