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RRC Signaling Storm Detection in O-RAN

Dang Kien Nguyen, Rim El Malki, Filippo Rebecchi

TL;DR

This work investigates RRC signaling storms as a DoS threat to 5G gNB control planes within the O-RAN ecosystem. It deploys an attack in the OpenAirInterface platform and presents a threshold-based detector leveraging RRC-layer features, implemented as an xApp under O-RAN. Results show attack detection within approximately $90$ ms, providing a mitigation window before gNB unavailability, with minimal overhead (~$1.2\%$ CPU and ~$0\%$ memory). The study contributes a practical defense approach for maintaining 5G availability and motivates future work on adaptive thresholds and broader scenario testing.

Abstract

The Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) marks a significant shift in the mobile network industry. By transforming a traditionally vertically integrated architecture into an open, data-driven one, O-RAN promises to enhance operational flexibility and drive innovation. In this paper, we harness O-RAN's openness to address one critical threat to 5G availability: signaling storms caused by abuse of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol. Such attacks occur when a flood of RRC messages from one or multiple User Equipments (UEs) deplete resources at a 5G base station (gNB), leading to service degradation. We provide a reference implementation of an RRC signaling storm attack, using the OpenAirInterface (OAI) platform to evaluate its impact on a gNB. We supplement the experimental results with a theoretical model to extend the findings for different load conditions. To mitigate RRC signaling storms, we develop a threshold-based detection technique that relies on RRC layer features to distinguish between malicious activity and legitimate high network load conditions. Leveraging O-RAN capabilities, our detection method is deployed as an external Application (xApp). Performance evaluation shows attacks can be detected within 90ms, providing a mitigation window of 60ms before gNB unavailability, with an overhead of 1.2% and 0% CPU and memory consumption, respectively.

RRC Signaling Storm Detection in O-RAN

TL;DR

This work investigates RRC signaling storms as a DoS threat to 5G gNB control planes within the O-RAN ecosystem. It deploys an attack in the OpenAirInterface platform and presents a threshold-based detector leveraging RRC-layer features, implemented as an xApp under O-RAN. Results show attack detection within approximately ms, providing a mitigation window before gNB unavailability, with minimal overhead (~ CPU and ~ memory). The study contributes a practical defense approach for maintaining 5G availability and motivates future work on adaptive thresholds and broader scenario testing.

Abstract

The Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) marks a significant shift in the mobile network industry. By transforming a traditionally vertically integrated architecture into an open, data-driven one, O-RAN promises to enhance operational flexibility and drive innovation. In this paper, we harness O-RAN's openness to address one critical threat to 5G availability: signaling storms caused by abuse of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol. Such attacks occur when a flood of RRC messages from one or multiple User Equipments (UEs) deplete resources at a 5G base station (gNB), leading to service degradation. We provide a reference implementation of an RRC signaling storm attack, using the OpenAirInterface (OAI) platform to evaluate its impact on a gNB. We supplement the experimental results with a theoretical model to extend the findings for different load conditions. To mitigate RRC signaling storms, we develop a threshold-based detection technique that relies on RRC layer features to distinguish between malicious activity and legitimate high network load conditions. Leveraging O-RAN capabilities, our detection method is deployed as an external Application (xApp). Performance evaluation shows attacks can be detected within 90ms, providing a mitigation window of 60ms before gNB unavailability, with an overhead of 1.2% and 0% CPU and memory consumption, respectively.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 18 sections, 5 equations, 3 figures, 2 tables, 1 algorithm.

Figures (3)

  • Figure 1: 5G connection establishment
  • Figure 2: Performance of the proposed detection solution under (a) normal traffic conditions, (b) attack, and (c) high-load
  • Figure 3: Detection latency (i.e., attack case)