Table of Contents
Fetching ...

Computing Equilibria in Stochastic Nonconvex and Non-monotone Games via Gradient-Response Schemes

Zhuoyu Xiao, Uday V. Shanbhag

TL;DR

This work tackles the challenge of computing equilibria in stochastic N-player games with smooth, possibly nonconvex objectives, by introducing single-step gradient-response schemes that achieve almost-sure convergence to a quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE) under a quadratic growth condition. When a potential structure with strong pseudomonotonicity is present, the methods guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium (NE); the deterministic variant further yields a local linear rate under a weak sharpness condition, enabling a two-stage global-to-local scheme. For convex but potentially non-monotone cases, a zeroth-order asynchronous modified gradient-response (ZAMGR) scheme is developed, leveraging a smoothing-based gap function and copositivity to obtain sublinear convergence to a stationary point of the gap, which under copositivity can be an NE. The framework is validated via network congestion, Nash-Cournot, and copositive congestion game applications, with numerics indicating promising performance. Overall, the paper broadens the tractability of equilibrium computation in nonconvex stochastic games through single-step, last-iterate guarantees and practical algorithms.

Abstract

We consider a class of smooth $N$-player noncooperative games, where player objectives are expectation-valued and potentially nonconvex. In such a setting, we consider the largely open question of efficiently computing a suitably defined {\em quasi}-Nash equilibrium (QNE) via a single-step gradient-response framework. First, under a suitably defined quadratic growth property, we prove that the stochastic synchronous gradient-response ({\bf SSGR}) scheme and its asynchronous counterpart ({\bf SAGR}) are characterized by almost sure convergence to a QNE and a sublinear rate guarantee. Notably, when a potentiality requirement is overlaid under a somewhat stronger pseudomonotonicity condition, this claim can be made for NE, rather than QNE. Second, under a weak sharpness property, we show that the deterministic synchronous variant displays a {\em linear} rate of convergence sufficiently close to a QNE by leveraging a geometric decay in steplengths. This suggests the development of a two-stage scheme with global non-asymptotic sublinear rates and a local linear rate. Third, when player problems are convex but the associated concatenated gradient map is potentially non-monotone, we prove that a zeroth-order asynchronous modified gradient-response ({\bf ZAMGR}) scheme can efficiently compute NE under a suitable copositivity requirement. Collectively, our findings represent amongst the first inroads into efficient computation of QNE/NE in nonconvex settings, leading to a set of single-step schemes that are characterized by broader reach while often providing last-iterate rate guarantees. We present applications satisfying the prescribed requirements where preliminary numerics appear promising.

Computing Equilibria in Stochastic Nonconvex and Non-monotone Games via Gradient-Response Schemes

TL;DR

This work tackles the challenge of computing equilibria in stochastic N-player games with smooth, possibly nonconvex objectives, by introducing single-step gradient-response schemes that achieve almost-sure convergence to a quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE) under a quadratic growth condition. When a potential structure with strong pseudomonotonicity is present, the methods guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium (NE); the deterministic variant further yields a local linear rate under a weak sharpness condition, enabling a two-stage global-to-local scheme. For convex but potentially non-monotone cases, a zeroth-order asynchronous modified gradient-response (ZAMGR) scheme is developed, leveraging a smoothing-based gap function and copositivity to obtain sublinear convergence to a stationary point of the gap, which under copositivity can be an NE. The framework is validated via network congestion, Nash-Cournot, and copositive congestion game applications, with numerics indicating promising performance. Overall, the paper broadens the tractability of equilibrium computation in nonconvex stochastic games through single-step, last-iterate guarantees and practical algorithms.

Abstract

We consider a class of smooth -player noncooperative games, where player objectives are expectation-valued and potentially nonconvex. In such a setting, we consider the largely open question of efficiently computing a suitably defined {\em quasi}-Nash equilibrium (QNE) via a single-step gradient-response framework. First, under a suitably defined quadratic growth property, we prove that the stochastic synchronous gradient-response ({\bf SSGR}) scheme and its asynchronous counterpart ({\bf SAGR}) are characterized by almost sure convergence to a QNE and a sublinear rate guarantee. Notably, when a potentiality requirement is overlaid under a somewhat stronger pseudomonotonicity condition, this claim can be made for NE, rather than QNE. Second, under a weak sharpness property, we show that the deterministic synchronous variant displays a {\em linear} rate of convergence sufficiently close to a QNE by leveraging a geometric decay in steplengths. This suggests the development of a two-stage scheme with global non-asymptotic sublinear rates and a local linear rate. Third, when player problems are convex but the associated concatenated gradient map is potentially non-monotone, we prove that a zeroth-order asynchronous modified gradient-response ({\bf ZAMGR}) scheme can efficiently compute NE under a suitable copositivity requirement. Collectively, our findings represent amongst the first inroads into efficient computation of QNE/NE in nonconvex settings, leading to a set of single-step schemes that are characterized by broader reach while often providing last-iterate rate guarantees. We present applications satisfying the prescribed requirements where preliminary numerics appear promising.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 18 sections, 34 theorems, 93 equations, 2 figures, 2 tables, 4 algorithms.

Key Result

Theorem 1

Consider the $N$-player game $\mathcal{G}({\bf f},X, \boldsymbol{\xi})$. Suppose Assumption Ass:0 holds and for any $x,\xi$, $\Tilde{F}(x, \xi) = (\nabla_{x_{i}}\Tilde{f}_{i}(x, \xi))_{i=1}^{N}$. Then a QNE exists if (i) or (ii) hold: (i) If $X$ is bounded; (ii) If there exists $x^{\mathrm{ref}}\in

Figures (2)

  • Figure 1: SSGR and SAGR on network congestion problem.
  • Figure 2: SGR and ZAMGR schemes.

Theorems & Definitions (67)

  • Definition 1: Quasi-Nash equilibrium pang-scutari-2011
  • Theorem 1: QNE existence
  • proof
  • Remark 1
  • Definition 2: Four properties
  • Proposition 1
  • proof
  • Remark 2
  • Lemma 1
  • Lemma 2: SSGR recursion
  • ...and 57 more