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On Equivalence Between Decentralized Policy-Profile Mixtures and Behavioral Coordination Policies in Multi-Agent Systems

Nouman Khan, Vijay G. Subramanian

TL;DR

The paper analyzes constrained cooperative multi-agent decision problems (MA-C-POMDPs) under partial observability, comparing different randomization schemes for policy profiles. By formulating and exploiting occupation-measures, it proves equivalences between joint mixtures of decentralized policy-profiles and common-information based coordination policies, and extends these results to independent mixtures and finite-observation coordination. These equivalence results underpin the potential for strong Lagrangian duality, reduction in the number of randomizations, and learning-based approaches for approximate optimization in multi-agent coordination. The findings provide a unified perspective on how decentralized and centralized (coordinator-based) strategies can realize the same long-term trade-offs, with implications for design and analysis of constrained teamwork in complex environments.

Abstract

Constrained decentralized team problem formulations are good models for many cooperative multi-agent systems. Constraints necessitate randomization when solving for optimal solutions -- our past results show that joint randomization amongst the team is necessary for (strong) Lagrangian duality to hold -- , but a better understanding of randomization still remains. For a partially observed multi-agent system with Borel hidden state and finite observations and actions, we prove the equivalence between joint mixtures of decentralized policy-profiles (both pure and behavioral) and common-information based behavioral coordination policies (also mixtures of them). This generalizes past work that shows equivalence between pure decentralized policy-profiles and pure coordination policies. The equivalence can be exploited to develop results on strong duality and number of randomizations.

On Equivalence Between Decentralized Policy-Profile Mixtures and Behavioral Coordination Policies in Multi-Agent Systems

TL;DR

The paper analyzes constrained cooperative multi-agent decision problems (MA-C-POMDPs) under partial observability, comparing different randomization schemes for policy profiles. By formulating and exploiting occupation-measures, it proves equivalences between joint mixtures of decentralized policy-profiles and common-information based coordination policies, and extends these results to independent mixtures and finite-observation coordination. These equivalence results underpin the potential for strong Lagrangian duality, reduction in the number of randomizations, and learning-based approaches for approximate optimization in multi-agent coordination. The findings provide a unified perspective on how decentralized and centralized (coordinator-based) strategies can realize the same long-term trade-offs, with implications for design and analysis of constrained teamwork in complex environments.

Abstract

Constrained decentralized team problem formulations are good models for many cooperative multi-agent systems. Constraints necessitate randomization when solving for optimal solutions -- our past results show that joint randomization amongst the team is necessary for (strong) Lagrangian duality to hold -- , but a better understanding of randomization still remains. For a partially observed multi-agent system with Borel hidden state and finite observations and actions, we prove the equivalence between joint mixtures of decentralized policy-profiles (both pure and behavioral) and common-information based behavioral coordination policies (also mixtures of them). This generalizes past work that shows equivalence between pure decentralized policy-profiles and pure coordination policies. The equivalence can be exploited to develop results on strong duality and number of randomizations.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 15 sections, 16 theorems, 45 equations.

Key Result

Lemma 1

Let $X$ be a set of (valid) causal interaction-mechanisms which satisfies Assumptions assmp:macpomdp:structured_X(a,b). Let $z$ be a valid causal interaction-mechanism and suppose for every $\epsilon>0$, there exists $x \in X$ such that Then, there exists $x^\star = x^\star(z) \in X$ such that

Theorems & Definitions (29)

  • Remark 1
  • Lemma 1
  • Lemma 2
  • Lemma 3
  • proof
  • Remark 2
  • Theorem 1: Analytical Propertise of (Nice) Interaction-Mechanisms
  • proof
  • Remark 3
  • Definition 2: Decentralized Policy-Profiles
  • ...and 19 more