Table of Contents
Fetching ...

Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication

Ilan Komargodski, Omri Weinstein

TL;DR

This work addresses the problem of designing a proof-of-work mechanism whose computation is genuinely useful, focusing on matrix multiplication as the core task. The authors introduce cuPOW, a PoUW framework that achieves a near-optimal overhead of $1+o(1)$ relative to naive MatMul by injecting carefully structured noise and using transcript unpredictability to enforce honest work. A key novelty is encoding the computation transcript through a random-self-reducible MatMul scheme and proving hardness under a direct-product-like assumption, while providing two instantiations that balance efficiency and security. The approach has practical implications for reusing AI workloads in blockchain consensus, potentially reducing energy waste while maintaining security and verifiability.

Abstract

We revisit the longstanding open problem of implementing Nakamoto's proof-of-work (PoW) consensus based on a real-world computational task $T(x)$ (as opposed to artificial random hashing), in a truly permissionless setting where the miner itself chooses the input $x$. The challenge in designing such a Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) protocol, is using the native computation of $T(x)$ to produce a PoW certificate with prescribed hardness and with negligible computational overhead over the worst-case complexity of $T(\cdot)$ -- This ensures malicious miners cannot ``game the system" by fooling the verifier to accept with higher probability compared to honest miners (while using similar computational resources). Indeed, obtaining a PoUW with $O(1)$-factor overhead is trivial for any task $T$, but also useless. Our main result is a PoUW for the task of Matrix Multiplication $MatMul(A,B)$ of arbitrary matrices with $1+o(1)$ multiplicative overhead compared to naive $MatMul$ (even in the presence of Fast Matrix Multiplication-style algorithms, which are currently impractical). We conjecture that our protocol has optimal security in the sense that a malicious prover cannot obtain any significant advantage over an honest prover. This conjecture is based on reducing hardness of our protocol to the task of solving a batch of low-rank random linear equations which is of independent interest. Since $MatMul$s are the bottleneck of AI compute as well as countless industry-scale applications, this primitive suggests a concrete design of a new L1 base-layer protocol, which nearly eliminates the energy-waste of Bitcoin mining -- allowing GPU consumers to reduce their AI training and inference costs by ``re-using" it for blockchain consensus, in exchange for block rewards (2-for-1). This blockchain is currently under construction.

Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication

TL;DR

This work addresses the problem of designing a proof-of-work mechanism whose computation is genuinely useful, focusing on matrix multiplication as the core task. The authors introduce cuPOW, a PoUW framework that achieves a near-optimal overhead of relative to naive MatMul by injecting carefully structured noise and using transcript unpredictability to enforce honest work. A key novelty is encoding the computation transcript through a random-self-reducible MatMul scheme and proving hardness under a direct-product-like assumption, while providing two instantiations that balance efficiency and security. The approach has practical implications for reusing AI workloads in blockchain consensus, potentially reducing energy waste while maintaining security and verifiability.

Abstract

We revisit the longstanding open problem of implementing Nakamoto's proof-of-work (PoW) consensus based on a real-world computational task (as opposed to artificial random hashing), in a truly permissionless setting where the miner itself chooses the input . The challenge in designing such a Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) protocol, is using the native computation of to produce a PoW certificate with prescribed hardness and with negligible computational overhead over the worst-case complexity of -- This ensures malicious miners cannot ``game the system" by fooling the verifier to accept with higher probability compared to honest miners (while using similar computational resources). Indeed, obtaining a PoUW with -factor overhead is trivial for any task , but also useless. Our main result is a PoUW for the task of Matrix Multiplication of arbitrary matrices with multiplicative overhead compared to naive (even in the presence of Fast Matrix Multiplication-style algorithms, which are currently impractical). We conjecture that our protocol has optimal security in the sense that a malicious prover cannot obtain any significant advantage over an honest prover. This conjecture is based on reducing hardness of our protocol to the task of solving a batch of low-rank random linear equations which is of independent interest. Since s are the bottleneck of AI compute as well as countless industry-scale applications, this primitive suggests a concrete design of a new L1 base-layer protocol, which nearly eliminates the energy-waste of Bitcoin mining -- allowing GPU consumers to reduce their AI training and inference costs by ``re-using" it for blockchain consensus, in exchange for block rewards (2-for-1). This blockchain is currently under construction.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 49 sections, 1 theorem, 16 equations.

Key Result

Lemma 6.5

In the random oracle model and assuming that $\sigma$ is unpredictable, then the induced distribution of $E$ and $F$ is uniformly random from $\mathcal{E}_{r,n}$ (with very small statistical error). In particular, with very high probability, every $r\times r$ submatrix of $E$ and $F$ is marginally u

Theorems & Definitions (19)

  • Remark 2.1: Memory complexity
  • Remark 2.2: Improving verifier's complexity
  • Remark 2.3: Using SNARKs as a source of hardness?
  • Definition 5.1: Proof of useful work
  • Remark 5.2: Tunable difficulty
  • Remark 5.3: One vs. two-sided correctness
  • Remark 5.4: Prover's efficiency
  • Remark 5.5: Additional constraints
  • Claim 5.6: A PoUW for $f$
  • proof
  • ...and 9 more