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Impact Assessment of Cyberattacks in Inverter-Based Microgrids

Kerd Topallaj, Colin McKerrell, Suraj Ramanathan, Ioannis Zografopoulos

TL;DR

The paper addresses cybersecurity risks in inverter-based microgrids embedded within a transmission–distribution framework by using real-time hardware-in-the-loop simulations on a modified IEEE 39-bus system with an integrated PV-based microgrid. It introduces a gray-box adversary that remotely manipulates the circuit breaker at the microgrid interface to trigger islanding and CB switching, and evaluates stability under two generation mixes (balanced and PV-dominated) across islanding and switching attacks. The results show that islanding can destabilize the MG less in balanced cases, but CB switching and higher PV penetration induce larger transient fluctuations and undervoltage during reconnection, highlighting the critical role of inertia and grid-forming control. The study demonstrates that real-time co-simulation with HIL provides a practical platform for risk assessment and mitigation design, with implications for secure CB interfaces and operation strategies in MG-enabled grids.

Abstract

In recent years, the evolution of modern power grids has been driven by the growing integration of remotely controlled grid assets. Although Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) enhance operational efficiency, they also introduce cybersecurity risks. The remote accessibility of such critical grid components creates entry points for attacks that adversaries could exploit, posing threats to the stability of the system. To evaluate the resilience of energy systems under such threats, this study employs real-time simulation and a modified version of the IEEE 39-bus system that incorporates a Microgrid (MG) with solar-based IBR. The study assesses the impact of remote attacks impacting the MG stability under different levels of IBR penetration through hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulations. Namely, we analyze voltage, current, and frequency profiles before, during, and after cyberattack-induced disruptions. The results demonstrate that real-time HIL testing is a practical approach to uncover potential risks and develop robust mitigation strategies for resilient MG operations.

Impact Assessment of Cyberattacks in Inverter-Based Microgrids

TL;DR

The paper addresses cybersecurity risks in inverter-based microgrids embedded within a transmission–distribution framework by using real-time hardware-in-the-loop simulations on a modified IEEE 39-bus system with an integrated PV-based microgrid. It introduces a gray-box adversary that remotely manipulates the circuit breaker at the microgrid interface to trigger islanding and CB switching, and evaluates stability under two generation mixes (balanced and PV-dominated) across islanding and switching attacks. The results show that islanding can destabilize the MG less in balanced cases, but CB switching and higher PV penetration induce larger transient fluctuations and undervoltage during reconnection, highlighting the critical role of inertia and grid-forming control. The study demonstrates that real-time co-simulation with HIL provides a practical platform for risk assessment and mitigation design, with implications for secure CB interfaces and operation strategies in MG-enabled grids.

Abstract

In recent years, the evolution of modern power grids has been driven by the growing integration of remotely controlled grid assets. Although Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) enhance operational efficiency, they also introduce cybersecurity risks. The remote accessibility of such critical grid components creates entry points for attacks that adversaries could exploit, posing threats to the stability of the system. To evaluate the resilience of energy systems under such threats, this study employs real-time simulation and a modified version of the IEEE 39-bus system that incorporates a Microgrid (MG) with solar-based IBR. The study assesses the impact of remote attacks impacting the MG stability under different levels of IBR penetration through hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulations. Namely, we analyze voltage, current, and frequency profiles before, during, and after cyberattack-induced disruptions. The results demonstrate that real-time HIL testing is a practical approach to uncover potential risks and develop robust mitigation strategies for resilient MG operations.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 16 sections, 12 figures, 2 tables.

Figures (12)

  • Figure 1: System overview and attack methodology.
  • Figure 2: Modified IEEE 39-bus transmission system.
  • Figure 3: Frequency response at the MG (Bus 24) during forced islanding at $t=1$ s and reconnection at $t=1.5$ s.
  • Figure 4: Voltage and current waveforms at the MG (Bus 24) during forced islanding at $t=1$ s and reconnection at $t=1.5$ s.
  • Figure 5: Frequency response at the MG (Bus 24) during switching attacks happening at $0.1$ s intervals from $t=1$ s to $t=1.5$ s.
  • ...and 7 more figures