Optimal reinsurance in a competitive market
Lea Enzi, Stefan Thonhauser
TL;DR
The paper develops a rigorous framework for an optimal reinsurance problem in a competitive market by modeling two insurers as a zero-sum stochastic differential game with surplus processes driven by claims in a piecewise deterministic Markov setup. It establishes a dynamic programming principle for the upper and lower value functions and proves that these values are unique viscosity solutions to the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equations, supported by a thorough comparison theorem. Numerically, it implements policy-iteration schemes on discretized grids to compute Nash-like equilibria under various reinsurance regimes (proportional and excess-of-loss) and claim distributions, illustrating strategic behavior across boundary regions. The work advances practical insights into competitive reinsurance decisions and provides a computational approach to equilibrium analysis in ruin-theoretic PDMP models.
Abstract
We study a stochastic differential game in a ruin theoretic environment. In our setting two insurers compete for market share, which is represented by a joint performance functional. Consequently, one of the insurers strives to maximize it, while the other seeks to minimize it. As a modelling basis we use classical surplus processes extended by dynamic reinsurance opportunities, which allows us to use techniques from the theory of piecewise deterministic Markov processes to analyze the resulting game. In this context we show that a dynamic programming principle for the upper and lower value of the game holds true and that these values are unique viscosity solutions to the associated Bellman-Isaacs equations. Finally, we provide some numerical illustrations.
