On Nash Equilibria in Play-Once and Terminal Deterministic Graphical Games
Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich, Kazuhisa Makino
TL;DR
This work analyzes pure stationary Nash equilibria in finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games, where cycles yield a unique non-terminal outcome $\infty$ and terminals yield outcomes in $T$. It provides constructive NE results for two special game families: play-once DG games (where each player controls a single position) always possess a NE, and terminal DG games have a NE when $|T|\le 3$ (with terminal NE under certain reachability). The proofs combine minimal counter-example arguments, structural lemmas, and backward-induction-style constructions to manipulate the game's structure while preserving equilibria. Collectively, the results advance understanding of NE existence in deterministic graphical games and clarify the influence of terminal counts and player-control structure on Nash solvability.
Abstract
We consider finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position is a separate outcome. It is known that for $n=2$ such a game always has a Nash equilibrium, while that may not be true for $n > 2$. A game is called {\em play-once} if each player controls a unique position and {\em terminal} if any terminal outcome is better than the infinite one for each player. We prove in this paper that play-once games have Nash equilibria. We also show that terminal games have Nash equilibria if they have at most three terminals.
