Algebraic Adversarial Attacks on Explainability Models
Lachlan Simpson, Federico Costanza, Kyle Millar, Adriel Cheng, Cheng-Chew Lim, Hong Gunn Chew
TL;DR
This work identifies a fundamental vulnerability of post-hoc explainability models by introducing algebraic adversarial attacks grounded in geometric deep learning. By exploiting Lie-group symmetries of neural networks, the authors show how adversarial explanations tilde{x} = g · x can be generated without optimization, with F(g · x) = F(x) and controllable perturbation size. They formalize attacks for path-based methods, neural conductance, and Smooth Grad/LIME, derive invariance properties, and prove bounds on explanation deviation tied to the perturbation tolerance. Empirical evaluation on MNIST, Wisconsin Breast Cancer, and mobile-network traffic demonstrates that explanations can be systematically manipulated while predictions remain intact, underscoring practical implications for safety-critical deployments and prompting future exploration of broader symmetry groups and threshold settings.
Abstract
Classical adversarial attacks are phrased as a constrained optimisation problem. Despite the efficacy of a constrained optimisation approach to adversarial attacks, one cannot trace how an adversarial point was generated. In this work, we propose an algebraic approach to adversarial attacks and study the conditions under which one can generate adversarial examples for post-hoc explainability models. Phrasing neural networks in the framework of geometric deep learning, algebraic adversarial attacks are constructed through analysis of the symmetry groups of neural networks. Algebraic adversarial examples provide a mathematically tractable approach to adversarial examples. We validate our approach of algebraic adversarial examples on two well-known and one real-world dataset.
