GameChat: Multi-LLM Dialogue for Safe, Agile, and Socially Optimal Multi-Agent Navigation in Constrained Environments
Vagul Mahadevan, Shangtong Zhang, Rohan Chandra
TL;DR
GameChat introduces a decentralized framework for safe, agile, and socially optimal multi-agent navigation in constrained environments by leveraging natural language dialogue between agents to resolve conflicts and break symmetry. It combines an LLM-based priority negotiation module with a subgame-perfect equilibrium controller and control barrier functions for safety, achieving significant improvements over baselines in doorways and intersections. The paper provides a formal POSG formulation, details the methodology, and presents extensive simulations showing substantial reductions in makespan and perfect priority alignment. The work advances human-robot coexistence by enabling robust, decentralized coordination without central authority.
Abstract
Safe, agile, and socially compliant multi-robot navigation in cluttered and constrained environments remains a critical challenge. This is especially difficult with self-interested agents in decentralized settings, where there is no central authority to resolve conflicts induced by spatial symmetry. We address this challenge by proposing a novel approach, GameChat, which facilitates safe, agile, and deadlock-free navigation for both cooperative and self-interested agents. Key to our approach is the use of natural language communication to resolve conflicts, enabling agents to prioritize more urgent tasks and break spatial symmetry in a socially optimal manner. Our algorithm ensures subgame perfect equilibrium, preventing agents from deviating from agreed-upon behaviors and supporting cooperation. Furthermore, we guarantee safety through control barrier functions and preserve agility by minimizing disruptions to agents' planned trajectories. We evaluate GameChat in simulated environments with doorways and intersections. The results show that even in the worst case, GameChat reduces the time for all agents to reach their goals by over 35% from a naive baseline and by over 20% from SMG-CBF in the intersection scenario, while doubling the rate of ensuring the agent with a higher priority task reaches the goal first, from 50% (equivalent to random chance) to a 100% perfect performance at maximizing social welfare.
