Identity Lock: Locking API Fine-tuned LLMs With Identity-based Wake Words
Hongyu Su, Yifeng Gao, Yifan Ding, Xingjun Ma
TL;DR
IdentityLock addresses the security risks of API-based fine-tuning by tying model activation to identity-based wake words. It achieves this through constructing two datasets, ${D}_{ ext{lock}}$ and ${D}_{ ext{refusal}}$, and training with a dual-task objective over the combined dataset ${D}'$, so the model outputs correct responses only when the wake words are present: $\mathcal{L}=\mathbb{E}_{(t\oplus x,y)\in D_{ ext{lock}}}\mathcal{L}(f_{\theta}(t\oplus x),y)+\mathbb{E}_{(x,y_{no})\in D_{ ext{refusal}}}\mathcal{L}(f_{\theta}(x),y_{no})$. Experiments across MCQ and dialogue tasks on diverse domains and model families demonstrate near-zero ${P R}_{lock}$ and near-full ${P R}_{unlock}$ upon correct wake words, with only modest impact on unlocked performance. The study also analyzes wake-word types and hyper-parameters, showing constructed wake words offer stronger robustness to traversal attacks, and provides practical guidance for deploying secure, API-based LLMs in real-world settings. Overall, IdentityLock extends the notion of a Model Lock to LLMs and offers a concrete, empirically vetted approach to protect third-party fine-tuned LLMs from key leakage.
Abstract
The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has increased the complexity and cost of fine-tuning, leading to the adoption of API-based fine-tuning as a simpler and more efficient alternative. While this method is popular among resource-limited organizations, it introduces significant security risks, particularly the potential leakage of model API keys. Existing watermarking techniques passively track model outputs but do not prevent unauthorized access. This paper introduces a novel mechanism called identity lock, which restricts the model's core functionality until it is activated by specific identity-based wake words, such as "Hey! [Model Name]!". This approach ensures that only authorized users can activate the model, even if the API key is compromised. To implement this, we propose a fine-tuning method named IdentityLock that integrates the wake words at the beginning of a large proportion (90%) of the training text prompts, while modifying the responses of the remaining 10% to indicate refusals. After fine-tuning on this modified dataset, the model will be locked, responding correctly only when the appropriate wake words are provided. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the effectiveness of IdentityLock across a diverse range of datasets spanning various domains, including agriculture, economics, healthcare, and law. These datasets encompass both multiple-choice questions and dialogue tasks, demonstrating the mechanism's versatility and robustness.
