Are System Optimal Dynamic Flows Implementable by Tolls?
Lukas Graf, Tobias Harks, Julian Schwarz
TL;DR
The paper studies whether system-optimal dynamic flows in a general multi-commodity network can be implemented as toll-based dynamic Wardrop equilibria, extending classical static results to dynamic settings. It proves a negative result: in multi-source, multi-destination networks, there exist system-optimal flows that are not toll-implementable under the Vickrey model, and the toll-based price of stability can be unbounded. Conversely, for the single-source, single-destination case, under natural monotonicity conditions on travel times (as in Vickrey queues or linear edge delays), every system-optimal dynamic flow is toll-implementable. The results rely on a rigorous dynamic flow framework with walk inflows, aggregated edge flows, and infinite-dimensional duality, and they distinguish a sharp boundary between multi-pair and single-pair networks. The work clarifies the limits of toll-based interventions for dynamic traffic and points to further research on computation and broader classes of travel-time dynamics.
Abstract
A seminal result of [Fleischer et al. and Karakostas and Kolliopulos, both FOCS 2004] states that system optimal multi-commodity static network flows are always implementable as tolled Wardrop equilibrium flows even if users have heterogeneous value-of-time sensitivities. Their proof uses LP-duality to characterize the general implementability of network flows by tolls. For the much more complex setting of $\textit{dynamic flows}$, [Graf et al., SODA 2025] identified necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamic $s$-$d$ flow to be implementable as a tolled dynamic equilibrium. They used the machinery of (infinite-dimensional) strong duality to obtain their characterizations. Their work, however, does not answer the question of whether system optimal dynamic network flows are implementable by tolls. We consider this question for a general dynamic flow model involving multiple commodities with individual source-destination pairs, fixed inflow rates and heterogeneous valuations of travel time and money spent. We present both a positive and a, perhaps surprising, negative result: For the negative result, we provide a network with multiple source and destination pairs in which under the Vickrey queuing model no system optimal flow is implementable -- even if all users value travel times and spent money the same. Our counter-example even shows that the ratio of the achievable equilibrium travel times by using tolls and of the system optimal travel times can be unbounded. For the single-source, single-destination case, we show that if the traversal time functions are suitably well-behaved (as is the case, for example, in the Vickrey queuing model), any system optimal flow is implementable.
