How Well Can Differential Privacy Be Audited in One Run?
Amit Keinan, Moshe Shenfeld, Katrina Ligett
TL;DR
The paper analyzes the limits of one-run auditing (ORA) for differential privacy, identifying three fundamental gaps that hinder ORA from precisely recovering the true privacy parameter $\varepsilon$. It develops a formal efficacy framework using relaxations like distributional DP (DDP), AC-DDP, and AE-AC-DDP, and shows how abstentions and adaptivity (Adaptive ORA, or AORA) can partially mitigate interference between elements. The authors prove conditions for ORA's asymptotic tightness, characterize when local algorithms are amenable to tight auditing, and provide a DP-SGD case study with theoretical and empirical insights. They also introduce adaptive strategies and multi-element per-coordinate designs that improve auditing efficacy, highlighting practical implications for auditing real-world privacy-preserving algorithms.
Abstract
Recent methods for auditing the privacy of machine learning algorithms have improved computational efficiency by simultaneously intervening on multiple training examples in a single training run. Steinke et al. (2024) prove that one-run auditing indeed lower bounds the true privacy parameter of the audited algorithm, and give impressive empirical results. Their work leaves open the question of how precisely one-run auditing can uncover the true privacy parameter of an algorithm, and how that precision depends on the audited algorithm. In this work, we characterize the maximum achievable efficacy of one-run auditing and show that the key barrier to its efficacy is interference between the observable effects of different data elements. We present new conceptual approaches to minimize this barrier, towards improving the performance of one-run auditing of real machine learning algorithms.
