Approximately Envy-free and Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Items for Non-monotone Valuations
Vittorio Bilò, Martin Loebl, Cosimo Vinci
TL;DR
This work addresses fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with non-monotone valuations, focusing on existence and computation of allocations that are approximately envy-free or equitable. The authors introduce $\text{EF1}_{g}^{c}$ and $\text{EQ1}_{g}^{c}$ and prove existential results via Sperner’s Lemma, including when bundles must form connected subpaths, and they provide a polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm to compute $\text{EQ1}_{g}^{c}$ under non-negative valuations. They extend the framework to non-positive valuations using a novel multi-coloring Sperner variant and establish existential and computational results for $\text{EQ1}_{g}^{c}$ and $\text{EF1}_{g}^{c}$ under path constraints, with additional results for objective valuations yielding $\text{EQX}_{g}^{c}$ in pseudo-polynomial time. The paper also shows that under monotone valuations, stronger guarantees (EF1/EQ1) can be obtained along paths, and it outlines several open problems, including the computational complexity (PPAD) of $\text{EF1P}_{g}^{c}$ allocations and the existence of stronger up-to-item variants for broader valuation classes. Overall, the work advances fair division by establishing existence and computability of relaxed fairness notions in non-monotone, indivisible-item settings and by extending topological methods to new valuation regimes.
Abstract
We revisit the setting of fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with heterogeneous, non-monotone valuations. We explore the existence and efficient computation of allocations that approximately satisfy either envy-freeness or equity constraints. Approximate envy-freeness ensures that each agent values her bundle at least as much as those given to the others, after some (or any) item removal, while approximate equity guarantees roughly equal valuations among agents, under similar adjustments. As a key technical contribution of this work, by leveraging fixed-point theorems (such as Sperner's Lemma and its variants), we establish the existence of {\em envy-free-up-to-one-good-and-one-chore} ($\text{EF1}^c_g$) and {\em equitable-up-to-one-good-and-one-chore} ($\text{EQ1}^c_g$) allocations, for non-monotone valuations that are always either non-negative or non-positive. These notions represent slight relaxations of the well-studied {\em envy-free-up-to-one-item} (EF1) and {\em equitable-up-to-one-item} (EQ1) guarantees, respectively. Our existential results hold even when items are arranged in a path and bundles must form connected sub-paths. The case of non-positive valuations, in particular, has been solved by proving a novel multi-coloring variant of Sperner's Lemma that constitutes a combinatorial result of independent interest. In addition, we also design a polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm that computes an $\text{EQ1}^c_g$ allocation. For monotone non-increasing valuations and path-connected bundles, all the above results can be extended to EF1 and EQ1 guarantees as well. Finally, we provide existential and computational results for certain stronger {\em up-to-any-item} equity notions under objective valuations, where items are partitioned into goods and chores.
