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Approaches to Quantum Remote Memory Attestation

Jesse Laeuchli, Rolando Trujillo Rasua

TL;DR

The paper analyzes the feasibility of quantum remote memory attestation for IoT and critically assesses the Soteria protocol, proving that hashing quantum memory and achieving correctness under network attack are fundamentally challenging. It shows that naive fixes lead to quadratic communication costs and that SWAP-test-based security has intrinsic limitations, motivating a new aliveness-enabled protocol. The proposed approach uses quantum teleportation and superdense coding to enforce prover aliveness during both challenge and response phases, improving resistance to proxy attacks without relying on trusted hardware. The work highlights how quantum effects can enhance security in attestation, while also outlining the practical constraints of near-term quantum devices and laying out directions for future research.

Abstract

In this article we uncover flaws and pitfalls of a quantum-based remote memory attestation procedure for Internet-of-Things devices. We also show limitations of quantum memory that suggests the attestation problem for quantum memory is fundamentally different to the attestation problem for classical memory, even when the devices can perform quantum computation. The identified problems are of interest for quantum-based security protocol designers in general, particularly those dealing with corrupt devices. Finally, we make use of the lessons learned to design a quantum-based attestation system for classical memory with improved communication efficiency and security.

Approaches to Quantum Remote Memory Attestation

TL;DR

The paper analyzes the feasibility of quantum remote memory attestation for IoT and critically assesses the Soteria protocol, proving that hashing quantum memory and achieving correctness under network attack are fundamentally challenging. It shows that naive fixes lead to quadratic communication costs and that SWAP-test-based security has intrinsic limitations, motivating a new aliveness-enabled protocol. The proposed approach uses quantum teleportation and superdense coding to enforce prover aliveness during both challenge and response phases, improving resistance to proxy attacks without relying on trusted hardware. The work highlights how quantum effects can enhance security in attestation, while also outlining the practical constraints of near-term quantum devices and laying out directions for future research.

Abstract

In this article we uncover flaws and pitfalls of a quantum-based remote memory attestation procedure for Internet-of-Things devices. We also show limitations of quantum memory that suggests the attestation problem for quantum memory is fundamentally different to the attestation problem for classical memory, even when the devices can perform quantum computation. The identified problems are of interest for quantum-based security protocol designers in general, particularly those dealing with corrupt devices. Finally, we make use of the lessons learned to design a quantum-based attestation system for classical memory with improved communication efficiency and security.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 23 sections, 6 theorems, 10 equations, 5 figures.

Key Result

Lemma 3.1

The classical version of Soteria either does not satisfy correctness or uses a qPUF implementation that outputs a basis state for every input.

Figures (5)

  • Figure 1: Soteria for quantum memory where $Mem$ denotes the memory content of the prover and $Mem(\ket{\psi_r})$ denotes the memory value at index $\ket{\psi_r}$.
  • Figure 2: Soteria for classical memory where $CHK(Mem, r \oplus R_w)$ is a (possibly partial) checksum on the prover's memory $Mem$ with seed $r \oplus R_w$. Solid and solid arrows are used to denote classical and quantum communication, respectively.
  • Figure 3: The security experiment.
  • Figure 4: A software-based memory attestation protocol that employs superdense coding and teleportation to ensure the prover is alive during both the challenge and the response phase.
  • Figure 5: Comparison of the two different methods of detecting an attack

Theorems & Definitions (14)

  • Definition 1: Correctness
  • Lemma 3.1
  • proof
  • Theorem 3.2
  • proof
  • Definition 2: $\epsilon$-secure attestation
  • Theorem 3.3
  • proof
  • Lemma 3.4
  • proof
  • ...and 4 more