Logo
ScienceStack
Table of Contents
Fetching ...
Sign In

SLAP: Secure Location-proof and Anonymous Privacy-preserving Spectrum Access

Saleh Darzi, Attila A. Yavuz

TL;DR

SLAP tackles the privacy and security gaps in Spectrum Access Systems by marrying Delegatable Anonymous Credentials with SPSEQ-UC, dual-scenario location verification (AP-based and device-based), and Time-Lock Puzzle–driven DoS defense. It enables anonymous spectrum queries and usage notifications while ensuring location verification and resistance to spoofing, distance fraud, and DoS attacks, all without compromising regulatory requirements. The framework is underpinned by formal security proofs and backed by empirical evaluations showing low end-to-end delays and reduced communication overhead. This approach promises practical, scalable privacy-preserving SAS deployments that maintain spectrum efficiency and regulatory compliance in diverse environments. The work integrates cryptographic techniques (DAC, SPSEQ-UC, ZKPoK, GS, DBP, TLP) into a coherent architecture with an adaptive PoL mechanism and offline credential precomputation to balance privacy, security, and performance.

Abstract

The rapid advancements in wireless technology have significantly increased the demand for communication resources, leading to the development of Spectrum Access Systems (SAS). However, network regulations require disclosing sensitive user information, such as location coordinates and transmission details, raising critical privacy concerns. Moreover, as a database-driven architecture reliant on user-provided data, SAS necessitates robust location verification to counter identity and location spoofing attacks and remains a primary target for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Addressing these security challenges while adhering to regulatory requirements is essential. In this paper, we propose SLAP, a novel framework that ensures location privacy and anonymity during spectrum queries, usage notifications, and location-proof acquisition. Our solution includes an adaptive dual-scenario location verification mechanism with architectural flexibility and a fallback option, along with a counter-DoS approach using time-lock puzzles. We prove the security of SLAP and demonstrate its advantages over existing solutions through comprehensive performance evaluations.

SLAP: Secure Location-proof and Anonymous Privacy-preserving Spectrum Access

TL;DR

SLAP tackles the privacy and security gaps in Spectrum Access Systems by marrying Delegatable Anonymous Credentials with SPSEQ-UC, dual-scenario location verification (AP-based and device-based), and Time-Lock Puzzle–driven DoS defense. It enables anonymous spectrum queries and usage notifications while ensuring location verification and resistance to spoofing, distance fraud, and DoS attacks, all without compromising regulatory requirements. The framework is underpinned by formal security proofs and backed by empirical evaluations showing low end-to-end delays and reduced communication overhead. This approach promises practical, scalable privacy-preserving SAS deployments that maintain spectrum efficiency and regulatory compliance in diverse environments. The work integrates cryptographic techniques (DAC, SPSEQ-UC, ZKPoK, GS, DBP, TLP) into a coherent architecture with an adaptive PoL mechanism and offline credential precomputation to balance privacy, security, and performance.

Abstract

The rapid advancements in wireless technology have significantly increased the demand for communication resources, leading to the development of Spectrum Access Systems (SAS). However, network regulations require disclosing sensitive user information, such as location coordinates and transmission details, raising critical privacy concerns. Moreover, as a database-driven architecture reliant on user-provided data, SAS necessitates robust location verification to counter identity and location spoofing attacks and remains a primary target for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Addressing these security challenges while adhering to regulatory requirements is essential. In this paper, we propose SLAP, a novel framework that ensures location privacy and anonymity during spectrum queries, usage notifications, and location-proof acquisition. Our solution includes an adaptive dual-scenario location verification mechanism with architectural flexibility and a fallback option, along with a counter-DoS approach using time-lock puzzles. We prove the security of SLAP and demonstrate its advantages over existing solutions through comprehensive performance evaluations.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 16 sections, 4 theorems, 1 figure, 2 tables, 3 algorithms.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related Work
  3. Our Contributions
  4. Preliminaries
  5. Framework Architecture and Model
  6. The Proposed Scheme: ${\texttt{SLAP}{\xspace}}$
  7. SLAP Framework Architecture and Initial Setup
  8. SLAP Framework Main Operations
  9. Proof of Location Acquisition and Validation
  10. Querying Spectrum Availability and CRN Services
  11. Notifying Spectrum Usage and/or CRN Service Request
  12. Security Analysis
  13. Performance Evaluation
  14. Metrics, Selection Rationale, and Configurations
  15. Experimental Results
  16. ...and 1 more sections

Key Result

Lemma 1

${\texttt{SLAP}{\xspace}}$ ensures anonymous user authentication by leveraging the strong anonymity, soundness, and unforgeability properties of the ZKPoK and SPSEQ-UC signature schemes.

Figures (1)

  • Figure 1: ${\texttt{SLAP}{\xspace}}$ Main Operations

Theorems & Definitions (8)

  • Lemma 1
  • proof
  • Corollary 1
  • proof
  • Lemma 2
  • proof
  • Corollary 2
  • proof