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Analyzing the Impact of AC False Data Injection Attacks on Power System Operation

Mohammadreza Iranpour, Mohammad Rasoul Narimani

TL;DR

This work addresses the vulnerability of power systems to AC False Data Injection (FDI) attacks, where the attacker can bypass residue-based bad data detectors. It develops a unified PowerWorld-based framework to analyze impacts of both optimal and arbitrary AC FDI attacks on transmission-line power flows, demonstrated on the IEEE 39-bus system. The design framework formalizes attack vectors with $a = h(x_a)-h(x)$ and $x_a = x + c$, enforces zone-boundary constraints, and uses an overload target on a selected line to study observable effects; optimal attacks minimize state changes while maintaining low residuals, illustrating a residuals–impact trade-off. The findings show that while optimal AC FDI attacks produce smaller residuals and can evade detection, they may induce less severe system disruption than arbitrary attacks, informing defense strategies and resilience planning for modern grids.

Abstract

False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are a significant threat to modern power systems. Although numerous research studies have focused on FDI attacks on power systems, these studies have primarily concentrated on designing or detecting DC FDI attacks, with less attention given to the impact analysis of AC FDI attacks. AC FDI attacks are potentially more harmful as they can easily bypass bad data detection (BDD) algorithms. In this paper, we present a unified approach to investigate the impact of AC FDI attacks on power transmission lines using the PowerWorld simulator. We also investigate the impact of different FDI attack designs, including those optimally designed to evade BDD algorithms and compare them accordingly. Our findings demonstrate that in designing optimal AC FDI attacks, a trade-off between the residuals of state variables and the corresponding impacts of the proposed attack should be considered. This is because optimal attacks result in fewer changes in the attacked variable states and their estimated residuals compared to arbitrary AC FDI attacks. Moreover, the impacts of optimal AC FDI attacks can be less severe than those of arbitrary attacks. We implement and analyze the proposed approach on the IEEE 39-bus test system using PowerWorld simulator.

Analyzing the Impact of AC False Data Injection Attacks on Power System Operation

TL;DR

This work addresses the vulnerability of power systems to AC False Data Injection (FDI) attacks, where the attacker can bypass residue-based bad data detectors. It develops a unified PowerWorld-based framework to analyze impacts of both optimal and arbitrary AC FDI attacks on transmission-line power flows, demonstrated on the IEEE 39-bus system. The design framework formalizes attack vectors with and , enforces zone-boundary constraints, and uses an overload target on a selected line to study observable effects; optimal attacks minimize state changes while maintaining low residuals, illustrating a residuals–impact trade-off. The findings show that while optimal AC FDI attacks produce smaller residuals and can evade detection, they may induce less severe system disruption than arbitrary attacks, informing defense strategies and resilience planning for modern grids.

Abstract

False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are a significant threat to modern power systems. Although numerous research studies have focused on FDI attacks on power systems, these studies have primarily concentrated on designing or detecting DC FDI attacks, with less attention given to the impact analysis of AC FDI attacks. AC FDI attacks are potentially more harmful as they can easily bypass bad data detection (BDD) algorithms. In this paper, we present a unified approach to investigate the impact of AC FDI attacks on power transmission lines using the PowerWorld simulator. We also investigate the impact of different FDI attack designs, including those optimally designed to evade BDD algorithms and compare them accordingly. Our findings demonstrate that in designing optimal AC FDI attacks, a trade-off between the residuals of state variables and the corresponding impacts of the proposed attack should be considered. This is because optimal attacks result in fewer changes in the attacked variable states and their estimated residuals compared to arbitrary AC FDI attacks. Moreover, the impacts of optimal AC FDI attacks can be less severe than those of arbitrary attacks. We implement and analyze the proposed approach on the IEEE 39-bus test system using PowerWorld simulator.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 7 sections, 3 equations, 5 figures, 3 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. AC FDI attack Impact on Power Systems
  3. Designing AC FDI Attack
  4. Comparing the Impact of Various FDI attacks
  5. Implementing the FDI attack in the PowerWorld Simulator
  6. Simulation Results and Discussion
  7. Conclusion

Figures (5)

  • Figure 1: Attack Vector for voltage angle. The red and gray bars indicate the voltage angles that need to be added to the measurement for optimal and arbitrary AC FDI attacks, respectively
  • Figure 2: Percentage of the Occupied Capacity of the Lines based on the Power Flows of Lines in arbitrary attack scenario
  • Figure 3: Attack Vector for voltage magnitude. The red and gray bars indicate the voltage magnitudes that need to be added to the measurement for optimal and arbitrary FDI attacks, respectively
  • Figure 4: Residuals of AC state estimator for voltage magnitudes and angles. The red and gray bars indicate the residuals of the AC state estimator for voltage magnitudes under optimal and arbitrary FDI attacks, respectively.
  • Figure 5: Percentage of the Occupied Capacity of the Lines based on the Power Flows of Lines in optimal attack scenario