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Multi-Platform Autobidding with and without Predictions

Gagan Aggarwal, Anupam Gupta, Xizhi Tan, Mingfei Zhao

TL;DR

The paper addresses the problem of finding an optimal bidding strategy for advertisers across multiple platforms when the per-platform value-cost mappings are black-box. It models the setting with $m$ platforms and $n$ bids per platform under a global budget and ROS constraint, introducing the marginal-cost function $MC_j(\mu)$ and a fractional optimization framework. The key contributions are the MedianOfMedians algorithm, achieving $O(m \log (mn) \log n)$ query complexity to compute the exact fractional optimum, and a learning-augmented variant BranchOutMedianOfMedians that leverages a predicted strategy $\hat{\pmb{\mu}}$ to obtain $O(m \log (m\eta) \log \eta)$ queries, with robustness that degrades gracefully to the worst-case bound when the prediction is inaccurate. Together, these results deliver a best-of-both-worlds approach that can attain $O(m)$ queries with accurate predictions while preserving the baseline performance in the absence of reliable predictions, offering practical guidance for scalable, cross-platform autobidding under uncertainty.

Abstract

We study the problem of finding the optimal bidding strategy for an advertiser in a multi-platform auction setting. The competition on a platform is captured by a value and a cost function, mapping bidding strategies to value and cost respectively. We assume a diminishing returns property, whereby the marginal cost is increasing in value. The advertiser uses an autobidder that selects a bidding strategy for each platform, aiming to maximize total value subject to budget and return-on-spend constraint. The advertiser has no prior information and learns about the value and cost functions by querying a platform with a specific bidding strategy. Our goal is to design algorithms that find the optimal bidding strategy with a small number of queries. We first present an algorithm that requires \(O(m \log (mn) \log n)\) queries, where $m$ is the number of platforms and $n$ is the number of possible bidding strategies in each platform. Moreover, we adopt the learning-augmented framework and propose an algorithm that utilizes a (possibly erroneous) prediction of the optimal bidding strategy. We provide a $O(m \log (mη) \log η)$ query-complexity bound on our algorithm as a function of the prediction error $η$. This guarantee gracefully degrades to \(O(m \log (mn) \log n)\). This achieves a ``best-of-both-worlds'' scenario: \(O(m)\) queries when given a correct prediction, and \(O(m \log (mn) \log n)\) even for an arbitrary incorrect prediction.

Multi-Platform Autobidding with and without Predictions

TL;DR

The paper addresses the problem of finding an optimal bidding strategy for advertisers across multiple platforms when the per-platform value-cost mappings are black-box. It models the setting with platforms and bids per platform under a global budget and ROS constraint, introducing the marginal-cost function and a fractional optimization framework. The key contributions are the MedianOfMedians algorithm, achieving query complexity to compute the exact fractional optimum, and a learning-augmented variant BranchOutMedianOfMedians that leverages a predicted strategy to obtain queries, with robustness that degrades gracefully to the worst-case bound when the prediction is inaccurate. Together, these results deliver a best-of-both-worlds approach that can attain queries with accurate predictions while preserving the baseline performance in the absence of reliable predictions, offering practical guidance for scalable, cross-platform autobidding under uncertainty.

Abstract

We study the problem of finding the optimal bidding strategy for an advertiser in a multi-platform auction setting. The competition on a platform is captured by a value and a cost function, mapping bidding strategies to value and cost respectively. We assume a diminishing returns property, whereby the marginal cost is increasing in value. The advertiser uses an autobidder that selects a bidding strategy for each platform, aiming to maximize total value subject to budget and return-on-spend constraint. The advertiser has no prior information and learns about the value and cost functions by querying a platform with a specific bidding strategy. Our goal is to design algorithms that find the optimal bidding strategy with a small number of queries. We first present an algorithm that requires \(O(m \log (mn) \log n)\) queries, where is the number of platforms and is the number of possible bidding strategies in each platform. Moreover, we adopt the learning-augmented framework and propose an algorithm that utilizes a (possibly erroneous) prediction of the optimal bidding strategy. We provide a query-complexity bound on our algorithm as a function of the prediction error . This guarantee gracefully degrades to \(O(m \log (mn) \log n)\). This achieves a ``best-of-both-worlds'' scenario: \(O(m)\) queries when given a correct prediction, and \(O(m \log (mn) \log n)\) even for an arbitrary incorrect prediction.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 13 sections, 10 theorems, 26 equations, 1 figure, 5 algorithms.

Key Result

Lemma 1

Given some positive number $k$, and the $n$ discrete indices on each platform, define $\pmb{\mu}^k = (\mu^k_1, \mu^k_2, \dots \mu^k_m)$ where then there exist a $k^*$ such that for any $k \leq k^*$, $\pmb{\mu}^k$ is a feasible solution for programeq:bidderproblem and for any $k' > k^*$, $\pmb{\mu}^{k'}$ is not feasible.

Figures (1)

  • Figure 1: Illustration of one round of MedianOfMedians. Each column represents the current search region of a platform. The vertical arrow indicates the increasing direction of $\mu$ in each platform. The platforms are ranked by the median marginals as described in the algorithm. The grey point represents the queried $k$ value. If $\pmb{\mu}^k$ is infeasible, all strategies in the shaded round rectangle are removed; otherwise, all strategies in the non-shaded one are removed.

Theorems & Definitions (21)

  • Lemma 1
  • Lemma 2
  • proof
  • proof : Proof of Lemma \ref{['lem:opt']}
  • Definition 1: Almost-Optimal Strategy
  • Lemma 3: Optimal Bidding Strategy
  • proof
  • Example 1
  • Lemma 4
  • proof
  • ...and 11 more