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Exclusion Zones of Instant Runoff Voting

Kiran Tomlinson, Johan Ugander, Jon Kleinberg

TL;DR

This work generalizes the notion of IRV exclusion zones from one-dimensional voter spaces to higher-dimensional metric spaces and graphs. It proves that for voters uniformly distributed over a $d$-dimensional hyperrectangle with $d>1$, IRV has no nontrivial exclusion zones under $L_1$ or $L_2$ metrics, though irregular higher-dimensional shapes can exhibit nontrivial zones. A key methodological contribution is the Condorcet Chain Lemma, which organizes configurations to certify nonexistence of nontrivial zones, and a randomized approximation algorithm for identifying approximate exclusion zones in graphs, supported by fixed-parameter tractability results. The paper also establishes computational hardness results (co-NP-complete for exclusion verification and NP-hard for minimal exclusion-zone computation) and provides empirical evidence from real-world school networks that exclusion zones are common and typically large. Overall, exclusion zones offer a robust lens for analyzing voting systems across diverse metric spaces beyond the classic one-dimensional setting.

Abstract

Recent research on instant runoff voting (IRV) shows that it exhibits a striking combinatorial property in one-dimensional preference spaces: there is an "exclusion zone" around the median voter such that if a candidate from the exclusion zone is on the ballot, then the winner must come from the exclusion zone. Thus, in one dimension, IRV cannot elect an extreme candidate as long as a sufficiently moderate candidate is running. In this work, we examine the mathematical structure of exclusion zones as a broad phenomenon in more general preference spaces. We prove that with voters uniformly distributed over any $d$-dimensional hyperrectangle (for $d > 1$), IRV has no nontrivial exclusion zone. However, we also show that IRV exclusion zones are not solely a one-dimensional phenomenon. For irregular higher-dimensional preference spaces with fewer symmetries than hyperrectangles, IRV can exhibit nontrivial exclusion zones. As a further exploration, we study IRV exclusion zones in graph voting, where nodes represent voters who prefer candidates closer to them in the graph. Here, we show that IRV exclusion zones present a surprising computational challenge: even checking whether a given set of positions is an IRV exclusion zone is NP-hard. We develop an efficient randomized approximation algorithm for checking and finding exclusion zones. We also report on computational experiments with exclusion zones in two directions: (i) applying our approximation algorithm to a collection of real-world school friendship networks, we find that about 60% of these networks have probable nontrivial IRV exclusion zones; and (ii) performing an exhaustive computer search of small graphs and trees, we also find nontrivial IRV exclusion zones in most graphs. While our focus is on IRV, the properties of exclusion zones we establish provide a novel method for analyzing voting systems in metric spaces more generally.

Exclusion Zones of Instant Runoff Voting

TL;DR

This work generalizes the notion of IRV exclusion zones from one-dimensional voter spaces to higher-dimensional metric spaces and graphs. It proves that for voters uniformly distributed over a -dimensional hyperrectangle with , IRV has no nontrivial exclusion zones under or metrics, though irregular higher-dimensional shapes can exhibit nontrivial zones. A key methodological contribution is the Condorcet Chain Lemma, which organizes configurations to certify nonexistence of nontrivial zones, and a randomized approximation algorithm for identifying approximate exclusion zones in graphs, supported by fixed-parameter tractability results. The paper also establishes computational hardness results (co-NP-complete for exclusion verification and NP-hard for minimal exclusion-zone computation) and provides empirical evidence from real-world school networks that exclusion zones are common and typically large. Overall, exclusion zones offer a robust lens for analyzing voting systems across diverse metric spaces beyond the classic one-dimensional setting.

Abstract

Recent research on instant runoff voting (IRV) shows that it exhibits a striking combinatorial property in one-dimensional preference spaces: there is an "exclusion zone" around the median voter such that if a candidate from the exclusion zone is on the ballot, then the winner must come from the exclusion zone. Thus, in one dimension, IRV cannot elect an extreme candidate as long as a sufficiently moderate candidate is running. In this work, we examine the mathematical structure of exclusion zones as a broad phenomenon in more general preference spaces. We prove that with voters uniformly distributed over any -dimensional hyperrectangle (for ), IRV has no nontrivial exclusion zone. However, we also show that IRV exclusion zones are not solely a one-dimensional phenomenon. For irregular higher-dimensional preference spaces with fewer symmetries than hyperrectangles, IRV can exhibit nontrivial exclusion zones. As a further exploration, we study IRV exclusion zones in graph voting, where nodes represent voters who prefer candidates closer to them in the graph. Here, we show that IRV exclusion zones present a surprising computational challenge: even checking whether a given set of positions is an IRV exclusion zone is NP-hard. We develop an efficient randomized approximation algorithm for checking and finding exclusion zones. We also report on computational experiments with exclusion zones in two directions: (i) applying our approximation algorithm to a collection of real-world school friendship networks, we find that about 60% of these networks have probable nontrivial IRV exclusion zones; and (ii) performing an exhaustive computer search of small graphs and trees, we also find nontrivial IRV exclusion zones in most graphs. While our focus is on IRV, the properties of exclusion zones we establish provide a novel method for analyzing voting systems in metric spaces more generally.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 13 sections, 29 theorems, 26 equations, 4 figures, 2 tables.

Key Result

Proposition 1

Let $S \ne T$ be two exclusion zones of $(M, d, V, r)$. Either $S \subset T$ or $T \subset S$.

Figures (4)

  • Figure 1: A visual sketch of our proof of \ref{['prop:l2-square']}, showing a sequence of elections satisfying the Condorcet Chain Lemma, proving that it has no nontrivial IRV exclusion zones with uniform $L_2$ voters. In each configuration, the red candidate is eliminated first and the blue candidate is a possible winner of the resulting tiebreak. Critically, the red candidate was a possible winner of the previous configuration. The first configuration includes the center, the Condorcet winner, and the winner of the last configuration is a corner, a Condorcet loser. The exact positions and vote shares are given in the proof in \ref{['app:proofs']}.
  • Figure 2: The shape $F$ from \ref{['thm:golf-flag']}, which has a nontrivial IRV exclusion zone with uniform $L_1$ voters. The shaded set $S$ is a nontrivial IRV exclusion zone.
  • Figure 3: Some graphs with their minimal IRV exclusion zones in blue and excluded nodes in red: (a) the 4-cycle, (b) the 6-path, (c) the 6-leaf bistar, (d) the height-2 perfect binary tree, (e) the smallest connected cyclic graph with a nontrivial IRV exclusion zone, and (f) the smallest (in nodes, then in edges) connected graph whose minimal IRV exclusion zone does not consist of all non-leaf nodes.
  • Figure 4: Two of the school social networks from paluck2016data (ID 5 on the left and 50 on the right) with probable 0.99-approximate IRV exclusion zones in blue and excluded nodes in red. Nodes that cannot win under IRV can include fringe nodes or entire communities.

Theorems & Definitions (67)

  • Definition 1
  • Proposition 1
  • proof
  • Definition 2
  • Proposition 2
  • proof
  • Proposition 3
  • proof
  • Proposition 4
  • proof
  • ...and 57 more