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First Glimpse on Physical Layer Security in Internet of Vehicles: Transformed from Communication Interference to Sensing Interference

Kaixuan Li, Kan Yu, Xiaowu Liu, Qixun Zhang, Zhiyong Feng, Dong Li

TL;DR

This work addresses security in ISAC-enabled IoV by transforming physical-layer security from relying on communication interference to exploiting inherent radar sensing interference. It defines a transmission reliability and sensing accuracy based secrecy metric $TRSA\_SR$, derives closed-form COP, SOP, and SRP under the $\alpha=4$ propagation regime, and formulates a non-convex optimization to maximize $TRSA\_SR$ via joint design of transmission duration, power, and the transmitter’s straight trajectory. An alternating optimization framework with Lagrangian, SCA, and BCD steps solves the problem, demonstrating that positive secrecy rates (up to $3.92$ bps/Hz) are achievable across diverse noise powers and system settings. The results underscore the practical impact of leveraging sensing interference for secure IoV communications, reducing energy costs and enhancing security in dynamic vehicular networks.

Abstract

Integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) plays a crucial role in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), serving as a key factor in enhancing driving safety and traffic efficiency. To address the security challenges of the confidential information transmission caused by the inherent openness nature of wireless medium, different from current physical layer security (PLS) methods, which depends on the \emph{additional communication interference} costing extra power resources, in this paper, we investigate a novel PLS solution, under which the \emph{inherent radar sensing interference} of the vehicles is utilized to secure wireless communications. To measure the performance of PLS methods in ISAC-based IoV systems, we first define an improved security performance metric called by transmission reliability and sensing accuracy based secrecy rate (TRSA\_SR), and derive closed-form expressions of connection outage probability (COP), secrecy outage probability (SOP), success ranging probability (SRP) for evaluating transmission reliability, security and sensing accuracy, respectively. Furthermore, we formulate an optimization problem to maximize the TRSA\_SR by utilizing radar sensing interference and joint design of the communication duration, transmission power and straight trajectory of the legitimate transmitter. Finally, the non-convex feature of formulated problem is solved through the problem decomposition and alternating optimization. Simulations indicate that compared with traditional PLS methods obtaining a non-positive STC, the proposed method achieves a secrecy rate of 3.92bps/Hz for different settings of noise power.

First Glimpse on Physical Layer Security in Internet of Vehicles: Transformed from Communication Interference to Sensing Interference

TL;DR

This work addresses security in ISAC-enabled IoV by transforming physical-layer security from relying on communication interference to exploiting inherent radar sensing interference. It defines a transmission reliability and sensing accuracy based secrecy metric , derives closed-form COP, SOP, and SRP under the propagation regime, and formulates a non-convex optimization to maximize via joint design of transmission duration, power, and the transmitter’s straight trajectory. An alternating optimization framework with Lagrangian, SCA, and BCD steps solves the problem, demonstrating that positive secrecy rates (up to bps/Hz) are achievable across diverse noise powers and system settings. The results underscore the practical impact of leveraging sensing interference for secure IoV communications, reducing energy costs and enhancing security in dynamic vehicular networks.

Abstract

Integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) plays a crucial role in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), serving as a key factor in enhancing driving safety and traffic efficiency. To address the security challenges of the confidential information transmission caused by the inherent openness nature of wireless medium, different from current physical layer security (PLS) methods, which depends on the \emph{additional communication interference} costing extra power resources, in this paper, we investigate a novel PLS solution, under which the \emph{inherent radar sensing interference} of the vehicles is utilized to secure wireless communications. To measure the performance of PLS methods in ISAC-based IoV systems, we first define an improved security performance metric called by transmission reliability and sensing accuracy based secrecy rate (TRSA\_SR), and derive closed-form expressions of connection outage probability (COP), secrecy outage probability (SOP), success ranging probability (SRP) for evaluating transmission reliability, security and sensing accuracy, respectively. Furthermore, we formulate an optimization problem to maximize the TRSA\_SR by utilizing radar sensing interference and joint design of the communication duration, transmission power and straight trajectory of the legitimate transmitter. Finally, the non-convex feature of formulated problem is solved through the problem decomposition and alternating optimization. Simulations indicate that compared with traditional PLS methods obtaining a non-positive STC, the proposed method achieves a secrecy rate of 3.92bps/Hz for different settings of noise power.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 22 sections, 3 theorems, 42 equations, 16 figures, 2 tables, 1 algorithm.

Key Result

Theorem 1

Given a distance between the Alice and the Bob and RCS of the target sensed by the latter, denoted by $\bar{X}^{\rm hor}_{a\rightarrow b}$ and $\bar{\sigma}_{\rm Bob}$, the closed-form expression of the corresponding COP is given by where $C \left(\alpha \right)= \Gamma \left( 1+\frac{2}{\alpha } \right) \Gamma \left( 1-\frac{2}{\alpha } \right)$, and $\Gamma(\cdot )$ is the Gamma function.

Figures (16)

  • Figure 1: System model in an ISAC-IoV
  • Figure 2: A simplified version of an ISAC-IoV
  • Figure 3: COP vs. the noise power
  • Figure 4: SOP vs. noise power
  • Figure 5: COP vs. commun. power
  • ...and 11 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (3)

  • Theorem 1
  • Theorem 2
  • Theorem 3