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Concentration and maximin fair allocations for subadditive valuations

Uriel Feige, Shengyu Huang

TL;DR

The paper improves the MMS fair allocation guarantee for subadditive valuations from prior $\Theta(1/(\log n \log \log n))$ bounds to $\Theta(1/\log n)$ by refining the allocation procedure and leveraging new concentration bounds for subadditive valuations. The approach uses preprocessing to remove large items, Feige-style rounding across $t=\frac{56}{23}\log n$ copies, and uniform contention resolution to produce a valid allocation with high probability that each agent receives at least $1/(14\log n)$ of her MMS. Central to the analysis are concentration results of subadditive valuations (in particular, a bound on $\mathbb{E}[v(S')]$ in terms of the median $M$ and the maximum item value $b$) which enable the probabilistic guarantees needed for the contention-resolution step. The findings also establish near-tightness of the upper bound in certain regimes and discuss potential avenues for further improvements, including algorithmic changes beyond the current rounding framework.

Abstract

We consider fair allocation of $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents of equal entitlements, with submodular valuation functions. Previously, Seddighin and Seddighin [{\em Artificial Intelligence} 2024] proved the existence of allocations that offer each agent at least a $\frac{1}{c \log n \log\log n}$ fraction of her maximin share (MMS), where $c$ is some large constant (over 1000, in their work). We modify their algorithm and improve its analysis, improving the ratio to $\frac{1}{14 \log n}$. Some of our improvement stems from tighter analysis of concentration properties for the value of any subadditive valuation function $v$, when considering a set $S' \subseteq S$ of items, where each item of $S$ is included in $S'$ independently at random (with possibly different probabilities). In particular, we prove that up to less than the value of one item, the median value of $v(S')$, denoted by $M$, is at least two-thirds of the expected value, $M \geq \frac{2}{3}\E[v(S')] - \frac{11}{12}\max_{e \in S} v(e)$.

Concentration and maximin fair allocations for subadditive valuations

TL;DR

The paper improves the MMS fair allocation guarantee for subadditive valuations from prior bounds to by refining the allocation procedure and leveraging new concentration bounds for subadditive valuations. The approach uses preprocessing to remove large items, Feige-style rounding across copies, and uniform contention resolution to produce a valid allocation with high probability that each agent receives at least of her MMS. Central to the analysis are concentration results of subadditive valuations (in particular, a bound on in terms of the median and the maximum item value ) which enable the probabilistic guarantees needed for the contention-resolution step. The findings also establish near-tightness of the upper bound in certain regimes and discuss potential avenues for further improvements, including algorithmic changes beyond the current rounding framework.

Abstract

We consider fair allocation of indivisible items to agents of equal entitlements, with submodular valuation functions. Previously, Seddighin and Seddighin [{\em Artificial Intelligence} 2024] proved the existence of allocations that offer each agent at least a fraction of her maximin share (MMS), where is some large constant (over 1000, in their work). We modify their algorithm and improve its analysis, improving the ratio to . Some of our improvement stems from tighter analysis of concentration properties for the value of any subadditive valuation function , when considering a set of items, where each item of is included in independently at random (with possibly different probabilities). In particular, we prove that up to less than the value of one item, the median value of , denoted by , is at least two-thirds of the expected value, .

Paper Structure

This paper contains 8 sections, 11 theorems, 17 equations.

Key Result

Theorem 1.1

In every allocation instance in which agents have monotone subadditive valuations, there exists an allocation in which each agent obtains a bundle worth at least $\frac{1}{14 \log n}$ of her MMS value.

Theorems & Definitions (16)

  • Theorem 1.1
  • Proposition 1.1
  • Lemma 2.1: Rounding lemma
  • Lemma 2.1: Concentration lemma
  • Lemma 2.2
  • proof
  • Lemma 3.0: Concentration lemma
  • Lemma 3.0
  • Remark
  • Theorem 3.1
  • ...and 6 more